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1.1 Air Traffic Management
Air Traffic Management (ATM) is the service ensuring the safe, efficient and expeditious
movement of aircraft in the airspace. The objectives of ATM are to ensure safe separation
between aircraft to prevent collisions, to organize and expedite the flows of traffic, and to
provide awareness and support to pilots about other aircraft and potential threats. ATM
comprises two main components: Air Traffic Control (ATC) and Traffic Flow Management
(TFM). ATC is the tactical safety separation service, that prevents collision between air-
craft, and between aircraft, terrain and obstructions. ATC time window ranges from 0
minute to approximatively 15 minutes. TFM allocates traffic flows to scarce capacity re-
sources (e.g. it meters arrival at capacity constrained airports). TFM time window ranges
from 15 minutes to days, weeks or even months, for planning purposes.
Air Traffic Management relies on several layers of technology supporting three essen-
tial functions: Communication, Navigation and Surveillance (CNS). Communication is the
capability to exchange information between aircraft, pilots, and air traffic controllers. Nav-
igation is the capability of aircraft to follow a given trajectory within prescribed accuracy
limits. Surveillance is the capability of air traffic controllers to monitor the positions of the
aircraft relative to each other and relative to obstacles or restricted airspaces.
In Europe, in the United States and around the world, current Air Traffic Management
Systems (ATMS) are aging, and large projects are being developed to handle the fast-
growing traffic demand. The resulting concepts of operations were introduced by the Joint
Planning and Development Office (JPDO) [69] and by the Eurocontrol SESAR Consortium
[32]. The JPDO proposes the NEXT GENeration (NextGen) [70] air transportation systems
for US operations, and the SESAR Consortium proposes the Single European Sky ATM
Research (SESAR) [123, 124, 125, 126] project for European operations. And indeed, the
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air traffic management system is left with no choice but to leverage the concurrent advent
of digital communication technology, satellite-based navigation and overall improvements of
available instrumentation to handle the demand and reduce system inefficiencies. However,
the obligation for the ATMS to maintain very high reliability and safety levels implies that
such new system technologies can be implemented only if they lead to a system with equal
or better safety characteristics than currently available. While system safety includes the
ability for the system to operate well under nominal conditions, it is also concerned with
off-nominal system behaviors, whereby operations are expected to still remain accident-free
for all known failure modes of the system.
1.2 Automation in Air Traffic Management Systems
Since the advent of the radar, automation has helped air traffic controllers (ATCs) and
traffic flow managers (TFMs) to obtain aircraft position, to display information about the
flights on the controller’s screen, to manage flight plans, to deconflict aircraft, to strategically
plan operations, etc. The objective has always been to improve the safety and make the
work of the controllers more efficient. Tools such as the Center TRACON Automation
System (CTAS) [29, 95] address this purpose and provide a large array of automation tools
for planning and controlling arriving and departing traffic. TRACON stands for terminal
radar approach control. CTAS includes various tools and control techniques to reduce
traffic congestion. The Traffic Management Advisor (TMA) [97, 98] and Multi-Center
Traffic Management Advisor (McTMA) [96, 18] are used to control arriving aircraft that
enter the Center from an adjacent Center or depart from feeder airports within the Center.
Those systems have already proven their capabilities [63, 34]. At the arrival level, the
Descent Advisor (DA) [49] and the Final Approach Spacing Tool (FAST) [19, 20] enable
more efficient operations.
Finally, ground operations and efficient runway operations planning can also improve
landing capacities [3]. On the departure side, Ground Delay Programs (GDP) [6] are used
to decrease the rate of incoming flights into a destination airport by delaying takeoffs, when
it is projected that arrival demand will exceed arrival capacity. The Fligh Schedule Monitor
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(FSM) [5] provides users with a real time estimate of the number of expected flights arriving
or departing to the 800 largerst airports in the US. The aim of those different layers of traffic
control is to maximize the use of available resources by ensuring smooth aircraft flows and
by avoiding terminal area congestion. Before their implementation, the most tacticals of
those systems requiring high automation, those involving safety, need to be extensively
tested and proven safe [22, 50, 83, 138].
One of the downsides of automation can be its poor implementation. Clumsy automation
has resulted in many incidents [122] some of them fatal. In 1991, writing about air transport
operations, Billings [9] formulated the following question:
Given the level of automation now available in transport aircraft, what should
be the role of the pilots? Present [1991, editor’s note] automation makes it easy
and even boring for the pilot to operate the aircraft under nominal conditions,
but more difficult to operate in contingencies. Yet pilots have demonstrated
throughout the history of aviation that they have little difficulty in operating
under normal circumstances. Should aircraft automation perhaps be designed
instead to provide somewhat less assistance under nominal conditions and con-
siderably more assistance under more difficult circumstances?
Automation in air traffic control is likely to follow the same pattern, even though aircraft
automation started earlier. More than 18 years after Billings stated these questions, they
are still current and real issues for air traffic control. The following states Billings’ view of
human-centered automation:
The pilot could call on automation modules to assist in problem diagnosis, in
evaluation of available alternatives, and in execution of alternative plans. The
automation would serve as the pilot’s assistant, providing and calculating data,
watching for the unexpected, and keeping track of resources and rate of
expenditure.
This statement is also valid for air traffic controllers. Current systems tend to provide
controllers with decision help, conflict detection and conflict resolution advisories. Watching
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for unexpected events is not only useful to help pilot and controllers, but is also a prerequisite
to ensure a safe degradation of automation in the event of a failure.
1.3 Failures in ATMS
The range of failures that can affect the ATMS is very broad, because of the complexity of
the system. The following presents a list of failures that have occurred in current ATMS.
 Ground infrastructures: Buildings and facilities are regularly affected by unex-
pected exogenous factors such as fires: the Southern California TRACON (SCT) had
to be evacuated in 2003 because of wildfires [111] threatening the facility. Tens of
aircraft were left in the sky without controllers to monitor and direct them.
 ATM computational infrastructure: Computers and network systems form the
backbone of the air transportation system information infrastructure. Computers
are not exempt from failures, whether the failures involve hardware (motherboard
and wiring) or software (incomplete functional requirements or erroneous software
implementation). Even though ATM providers make sure that the infrastructure is
redundant and robust to its own failures, it still happens that the entire system may
crash, for example due to a third-party application running on the same computers. In
2004, a computer glitch in the radar system disabled the surveillance of flights above
24,000ft [51] in the United Kingdom. Flight data had to be entered manually, resulting
in a decrease in capacity and in an increase in spacing distances: On September 24,
2007, a major breakdown [4] affected Southern California’s air traffic control system
due to a “design anomaly” in the way Microsoft Windows servers were integrated
into the system. The radio system shutdown, which lasted more than three hours,
left 800 planes in the air without contact to air traffic control, and at least five near
misses were reported. Air traffic controllers had to rely on their personal mobile
phones to send warnings to controllers at other facilities, and watched several losses
of separation without being able to alert pilots. This computer issue was known and
had not been fixed after a first failure that occurred in 2004 [133]. In October 2009
during the test of a new system, as air traffic controllers watched the skies above
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Salt Lake City International Airport, a Texas-bound flight departing from Salt Lake
City International Airport morphed into a flight from Nebraska that just landed [23];
Continental Airlines Flight 440 had just left the Salt Lake City International Airport
airspace and an air traffic controller transferred the flight to the computer of another
air traffic controller. But the computer misidentified it as SkyWest Flight 4881, which
had just landed in Salt Lake City from Omaha, Neb. The new system was shut down,
the backup system fired up and then the backup system was replaced with the 20-
year-old system air traffic controllers are currently using. To buy time to shut down
and boot the computer systems, air traffic control required that pilots place their
aircraft farther apart. Another potential threat to the computational infrastructure
is cyber attacks against the ATMS system [137], where a hacker could take control
over the computer system.
 Communications: Reliable communications are necessary to transmit information
from the radar to the control facilities, between ground facilities and aircraft, and
among ground facilities. If a control center loses its communication capacities, tens
or hundreds of aircraft are left deaf and blind, the air traffic controllers being the
eyes of the pilots. For instance, on September 25, 2007, a truck ran into a phone line
pole, shutting down all the communications in and out of Memphis Air Route Traffic
Control Center (ARTCC) . The pole was located two miles away from the control
center. Controllers had to coordinate with other ARTCCs using their cellphones [27,
57, 91, 99]. The breakdown lasted for about 4 hours. At the time of failure, there
were about 200 aircraft in the center’s airspace.
 Surveillance: Computer or radar failures can cause surveillance failures. For in-
stance, on July 9, 2008, Dublin’s radar system repeatedly failed to display the call
signs that normally identify each incoming aircraft [100]. After the second breakdown,
controllers lost confidence in the system and aircraft had to be grounded or diverted
to other airports. The outage affected more than 200 flights. In May 2007, the South-
ern California TRACON (SCT) was affected by an outage that let the controllers be
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mapless for an hour [134].
 Operations: In the event of a degradation of current operations, there exist backup
procedures described by ICAO [65]. This document explains the procedures that air
traffic controllers and pilot should follow, a failure should happen. Despite those
procedures, degradations of the operations and failures to follow the procedures still
occur. For instance, issues in closely-spaced parallel runway operations have been
investigated in several papers [114, 115]. An analysis of current en route air traffic
control usage during special situations can be found in an analysis [38] by the Fed-
eral Aviation Administration (FAA). Operation failures can lead to accidents such
as the 2002 collision [143] between a Russian passenger jet and a cargo plane over
Germany. Contradictory orders provided by the Traffic Collision Avoidance System
(TCAS) and the controller led to the collision. Operations might also be disrupted
by exogenous factors such as lightnings strikes [136]. In most cases, aircraft just fly
to the nearest airport [94, 136], disrupting local operations, but sometimes the strike
leads to disastrous consequences [101].
 Navigation: If the frequencies carrying the GPS signals are jammed [107] or spoofed,
GPS navigation becomes impossible. Aircraft highly rely on automated navigation
using autopilots and flight management guidance computers (FMGC). With the in-
crease of automation in modern aircraft, a loss of navigation not only impacts the
situational awarness, but also the flying capabilities since autopilot and autothrottle
become unavailable [1]. Navigation issues can also result from human errors: the
irresponsiveness of flight 188 [2] is an interesting example of communication and nav-
igation failures due to a human error, when the pilots did not contact ATCs for over
an hour and a half and overshot their destination point by 90 NM.
 Vehicles: An intruder can enter the airspace and consequently jeopardize the safety
of surrounding traffic. For instance, a private pilot can unintentionally get too close
to a restricted airspace such as the vicinity of major airports; A well known example is
the “Charles river VFR route” over the Charles River in boston, where aircraft often
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intrude in Boston International Airport’s airspace. If an aircraft flying Visual Flight
Rules (VFR) gets in the landing path of an aircraft flying Instrument Flight Rules
(IFR), this generates an abnormal situation that must be solved by the controller.
Vehicles can also be affected by exogenous factors: Flight 1549 [145] had to alight on
the Hudson river because of a bird strike.
 Airport closure: An airport or part of it can be closed, e.g. because of weather
conditions or other reasons [100]. The traffic needs to be reorganized and rerouted
towards other airports. For instance, Bangor International Airport is often a diversion
destination when freezing rain, snow or fog close Boston, New York or other major
Northeast metropolitan centers. On April 23, 2009, the control tower at Atlanta
Hartsfield Jackson International Airport was hit by a lightning strikes and severe
storms knocked out power to the area and the airport lights [15]. The tower had to be
evacuated, leaving the airport inoperative, no aircraft being able to take off or land.
In most of the examples above, disastrous consequences were avoided thanks to the
extraordinary ability of humans to accommodate unexpected situations.
Mostly due to exogenous factors, failures occur and will still occur in future ATMS,
despite all efforts made towards preventing them. A key point in ensuring safe air traffic
operation is to ensure a safe degradation of ATMS in the event of failures or unexpected
exogenous events.
1.4 Graceful Degradation of ATMS
Within this thesis, the process by which the current or future system keeps operating
safely despite degradation of the sustaining ATMS infrastructure will be called Graceful
Degradation. When all the subsystems of the ATMS work properly, the ATMS is said to
be working in nominal mode. When one or several subsystems fail, the ATMS works in
degraded mode: A graceful degradation occurs when the transition from a nominal mode
of operation to a degraded mode of operation is smooth and with no catastrophic event.
The term Graceful Degradation finds its origins in complex computer systems [146]. In
1967, the use of on-line spare modules and self-reconfigurable systems was already present in
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the literature [146]. Even though the current computer systems are much more complex, the
methods to ensure a graceful degradation have not changed much since then; Redundancy,
replication and diversity are the methods usually used to create fault tolerant systems
that ensure a graceful degradation [56, 88]. Such methods are used for hardware onboard
aircraft or in traffic control centers. Due to the size and the complexity of the ATMS, those
methods cannot always be used. For instance, an aircraft cannot be duplicated and the
cost of duplicating every control center would be prohibitive. However, the concept can
be immediately extended to overall systems such as the National Airspace System (NAS),
which include both physical assets (airplanes) and complex information infrastructures.
The failure modes identidied in section 1.3 and how to recover from them have been iden-
tified on an ad hoc basis, whereby accidents have triggered extensive studies and redesigns of
the air traffic management operations. Extensive experience by air traffic controllers about
incidents has progressively led them to always address “what if” questions during routine
operations, leading them to safe operations. This system comes complete with degraded
operation and recovery procedures, as described by the ICAO [65]. One example of such
fault-tolerant, or fail-safe procedure concerns departure operations: A safe, collision-free
path is completely specified to the aircraft prior to take-off, in such a way that the air-
craft may follow this path safely even in the case of complete communication failure during
take-off [65].
The examination of concepts of operation such as NextGen in the US [70] and SESAR [125,
126] in Europe reveals that system safety and graceful degradation are considered open re-
search issues for most future operations. Some of these research issues are gathered in
Appendix B, Table 6 for NextGen and Table 7 for SESAR.
In this thesis, the problem of graceful degradation is addressed from two viewpoints: an
analysis perspective and a design perspective.
1. Analysis: Graceful degradation sensitivity. Consider a given air traffic situation
(consisting of a number of aircraft with given positions, velocities and headings) along
with a Communication, Navigation and Surveillance system infrastructure, what is
the “sensitivity” of this situation relative to a sudden degradation in the ATMS?
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2. Design: Graceful degradation-compatible guidance. Consider a traffic config-
urations, that is, a set of aircraft with given origins and destinations, find a sequence
of avoidance maneuvers such that the safety of the airspace is never compromised.
The problem of a graceful degradation for ATMS by means of actions on traffic faces two
major challenges. The first challenge lies in the complexity of the system: ATMSs comprise
thousands of pieces of equipment and people working together, and the safety of passengers
and crews is at stake. The other challenge lies in the intrinsic nature of degradations:
Degradations are easy to identify, meaning that it is usually easy to determine if a piece
of equipment is functional or not. Then, a degradation is difficult to describe, meaning
that analyzing the impact of the degradation on the overall system is not an easy task.
Finally, since the consequences of the failure are usually difficult to evaluate, it is even
harder to handle the degradation and take appropriate mitigation actions.
Sheridan [128] analyzed the issues associated with the human-automation interactions
in the next generation air transportation systems: “Because of the greater interconnect-
edness of aircraft and subsystems, equipment failures and misapplied procedures can cause
perturbations that cascade throughout the whole system.” In the event of a failure of the au-
tomation, degradation modes should be available for the human controller to safely handle
the system. A thorough knowledge and modeling of the degradation modes of the ATMS
is necessary to ensure its safety.
Figure 1 presents a notional picture of the problem of graceful degradation for ATMS.
Nominal operations are represented by the green ellipse. The sustainability of the nominal
operations is ensured by a fully functional ATMS, depicted by the big blue shaded box at
the bottom of the figure. If a failure happens in the ATMS, it will propagate throughout the
system, which could potentially lead to off-nominal operations, possibly jeopardizing the
safety of the airspace (big red ellipse in the figure). Graceful degradation can be ensured
if a way to steer traffic from nominal to safe degraded conditions operations (dark green
ellipse) is always available. The degradation is called graceful if the operations never enter
the “red zone” of off-nominal operations. Enabling a graceful degradation is also achieved
by monitoring the degradability of the operations (blue box at the top of the figure).
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The identification of a degradation can be achieved at the technology level, using in-
tegrity sensors that provides the user with a health evaluation of the technology. It can
also be achieved at the operational level, by monitoring aircraft operations for unexpected
events.
1.5 Airspace Monitoring
Airspace monitoring consists of observing and analyzing the behavior of aircraft in the
airspace or a subset of the airspace. Depending on the phase of the flight and on the
objectives, different parameters can be monitored. This thesis focuses on the graceful
degradation of ATMS, therefore proposes monitoring tools that surveil parameters critical
to a graceful degradation. As presented in section 1.3, failures can affect technologies and
infrastructures, but also aircraft operations. Airspace monitoring can evaluate the capability
of a given traffic configuration to gracefully degrade, but also analyze the conformance of
current flight path to predetermined typical operations.
1.6 Objectives of the thesis
The objective of this thesis is to introduce the concept of graceful degradation for air traffic
management systems and to develop a better understanding of how to design, simulate,
measure, and monitor the true level of safety of an airspace. The objectives of the thesis
will be fulfilled by answering the following research questions (RQ):
 Research Question 0: What are the failures that can affect the ATMS?
 Research Question 1: What is the chain of events that results from a failure in
the ATMS?
 Research Question 2: What is the impact of different classes of failures on opera-
tions?
 Research Question 3: What is the sensitivity of a traffic configuration to potential
degradations?
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Figure 1: Scope of the thesis
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 Research Question 4: How can the smooth transition from nominal mode of
operations to degraded mode of operations be ensured?
 Research Question 5: Is it possible to monitor the airspace for a potential opera-
tional degradation?
1.7 Contributions
The main contribution of this thesis is to apply the notion of graceful degradation to air
traffic management systems. This non exhaustive study of a graceful degradation of ATMS
was achieved by the following contributions:
 Elaboration of an ontology for ATMS that enables the tracking of cascading failures
and the measurement of their operational impacts.
 Creation and validation of an input-output model for a TRACON and determination
its optimal capacity.
 Developement of an algorithm to probe traffic configurations in the event of a degra-
dation of CNS systems.
 Development of an algorithm to mitigate CNS degradations by spreading out aircraft.
 Creation of monitoring tools for en-route and terminal areas traffic using a novel
trajectory clustering algorithm.
1.8 Thesis outline
This thesis is organized in 6 chapters. This first chapter has provided the introduction of
the concept of graceful degradation applied to ATMS, and the motivation behind this work.
The following chapters address the various research questions presented in section 1.6.
The motivation of this thesis has been addressed by answering RQ 0 in this introduction
(section 1.3) by listing various classes of degradation that can affect the ATMS.
Chapter 2 addresses RQ 1 and RQ 2 by tackling the problem of describing degradations
through the analysis of failure propagation in ATMS. Measuring the impact of single or
multiple failures on the entire system is a key element to ensure an appropriate mitigation.
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Thus, an ontology of the ATMS is created and used to analyze the impact and measure
the operational consequences of a failure of a subsystem of the ATMS, by tracking the
propagation of technology failures and their impact on operations. This ontology enables
to measure operational impacts of technology or human failures in a systematic way.
Chapters 3 and 4 address RQ 3 and RQ 4 by tackling the problem of handling cer-
tain categories of degradation and proposing solutions for a graceful degradation. In both
chapters, the operational impact of particular failures or degradations is modeled and the re-
sponse of the system to the degradation is analyzed. Then, the design question is addressed
by proposing solutions to ensure the smooth transition from nominal mode of operation to
degraded mode of operation. The modeled degradation in Chapter 3 is a landing capacity
reduction at San Francisco International Airport (SFO) . Radar data are analyzed and a
queueing model for the TRACON is created and validated. This model is then used to
determine the optimal number of aircraft that maximizes the runway throughput, as well
as reduces airspace congestion. In Chapter 4, the modeled degradation is a failure in the
CNS system. A conservative model is presented and used in two different algorithms for
aircraft conflict avoidance in the presence of uncertainties. An planar version that pro-
vides optimal avoidance maneuvers is used to probe traffic configurations and analyze their
“degradation” capabilities. A 3-dimensional version of the algorithm is also proposed. This
algorithm ensures graceful degradation by spreading out the traffic and leaving a conflict
free configuration for 15 minutes.
Chapter 5 addresses RQ 4 and RQ 5 by tackling the problem of monitoring current oper-
ations for a potential degradation and have a solution ready to ensure a smooth degradation.
For en-route traffic, the modeled degradation is a failure in the CNS system as presented in
chapter 4. Complexity maps based on degradation of CNS capabilities are presented. For
terminal areas traffic, a knowledge base for typical operations is generated, and a tool that
identifies in real time the conformance of current flight to trajectories experimentally iden-
tified as typical is presented. The knowledge base is built using new trajectory clustering
methods presented in Appendix A.
Finally, chapter 6 draws the conclusions of the thesis.
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CHAPTER II
FROM TECHNOLOGY FAILURE TO OPERATIONAL
DEGRADATION: TRACKING FAILURES IN THE AIR TRAFFIC
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
2.1 Introduction
This chapter addresses RQ 1 and RQ 2, that is, “What is the chain of events that results
from a failure in the ATMS?”, and “What is the impact of a failure on operations?”,
respectively.
The ATMS is a complex system that involves thousands of pieces of equipment, vehicles,
facilities and people working together. In NextGen and SESAR, aircraft are expected to
have a broader range of capabilities than today and to support varying levels of total
system performance via onboard capabilities and associated crew training. To enable future
capacity, novel technologies, vehicle types and, operational concepts are needed and they
will ultimately bring forth new types (or modes) of failures and disruptions. If unattended,
these disruptions could result in severe setbacks for the NextGen and SESAR agendas and
for the health of the air transportation system as a whole. The increasing complexity of
the ATMS makes tracking the propagation and the impact of failures more difficult and
critical.
The objective of this chapter is to present an ontology that captures how failures or
perturbations cascade throughout the system and that measures their impact in terms
of loss of capabilities. If the impact of a failure is known, it becomes easier to ensure
the graceful degradation of operations when a failure occurs. The introduction of new
technologies and new aircraft is not possible unless they have been certified with a very low
failure tolerance, resulting in very few critical onboard failures. Nevertheless, failures still
occur as listed in section 1.3.
The ontology of the ATMS presented in this chapter is based on a multidimensional
14
decomposition, aiming at analyzing the impact of failures. A large share of the work in
ATM is devoted to improving the performances of the current system and assessing new
concepts of operations. Being at the center of air traffic operations, ATCs have been
often modeled ([16, 80, 102]). Human in the loop simulations are used to validate new
concepts [113]. Such experiments have also been developed to identify human errors in air
traffic control [130]. At a higher level, Pinon et al. modeled the air transportation system
as a supply chain [108] to measure its performance and constraints. Pinon et al. also
presented a morphological decomposition of the air traffic operations, to evaluate and select
airport technologies [109]. The system was decomposed from traffic phase, to possible
improvements, to operational concepts, to functions, to technologies and finally, to sub-
technologies. A matrix of alternatives is created from this morphological analysis [120]. This
decomposition is oriented towards finding appropriate technologies to optimize operations.
However, this decomposition is unidirectional and therefore, it is not possible to keep track
of failures and to measure the losses of performance. Di Benedetto et al. modeled the
ATMS as a stochastic hybrid system [24] to detect faults and mainly non-deterministics
human errors due to lack of “situational awareness” [28]. Those hybrid systems take into
account the dynamics of the agents and their potential errors. The ontology presented in
this chapter does not include the system’s dynamics but rather focuses on the deterministic
health of the overall system.
Sussman has developed processes to study “Complex, Large-Scale, Interconnected, Open,
Sociotechnical” (CLIOS) systems [132] and applied them to systems such as the transporta-
tion system of Mexico City. CLIOS systems are very large systems involving a large number
of agents and technologies, where social behaviors enter into account. CLIOS systems are
characterized by their internal and behavioral complexities [25]. The internal complexity
is the number of components in the system and their interractions. The behavioral com-
plexity [25] is the type of behavior that emerges from the system due to the components
interactions. The ATMS possesses both internal and behavioral complexities of a CLIOS
system. The emergent behavior is difficult to predict but unlike CLIOS systems, the re-
lationships between the subsystems of the AMTS are known and can be modeled, despite
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their complexity. The use of CLIOS system analysis methodologies focuses on identifying
policies or management intervention to improve the systems. If the ATMS was to be stud-
ied in the framework of a CLIOS system, this ontology would be an key enabler towards
understanding its complexity.
In a common report [39], the FAA and Eurocontrol presented the safety techniques used
in ATM. Techniques used to model the impact of failures on operations include, but are not
limited to, bow-tie analysis, even trees and fault trees [52, 81]. In all those frameworks, a
failure or an error is first identified, and then the possible causes (i.e the branches of the
tree) need to be generated by an expert. This ontology is an automated way to generate
fault trees.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: section 2.2 introduces the model,
its objectives, how the ATMS is decomposed, the links between the blocks, and how fail-
ures are introduced and tracked. Section 2.3 presents a validation of the ontology on two
scenarios. Finally, before the concluding remarks, section 2.4 presents two case studies to
illustrate the uses of the ontology.
2.2 Presentation of the ontology
2.2.1 Objective of the ontology
The objective of this ontology is to provide a better understanding of the propagation of
failures in the ATM system, and to measure their impact in terms of loss of capabilities.
The ontology shows the propagation of failures, from a facility, a controller or a technology,
all the way to operational capabilities. The model enables the identification of alternate or
backuptechnologies and the analysis of a loss of automation can be handled by a human
controller to ensure the safe transition from a nominal and automated mode of operation
to a degraded and manual mode of operation.
2.2.2 System
The modeled system is the air traffic management system. It comprises all the infrastruc-
tures, technologies, communication media, people, etc. The system also includes aircraft
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and pilots. In the current version, only existing infrastructures and technologies are in-
cluded, but the model is flexible enough, so that new technologies and automation systems
can be added to the ontology while they are being tested.
2.2.3 Ontology description
The ontology combines a physical decomposition of the major components of the ATMS,
and a functional decomposition of the air traffic operations into tasks and then functions.
This ontology combines elements from the decompositions presented by Pinon et al. on the
one hand [109], and Kim et al. on the other hand [71]. Pinon et al. decomposed air traffic
operations to identify enabling technologies. Kim et al. proposed a task decomposition for
function allocation.
This ontology starts from a physical decomposition of the system into facilities and
aircraft, then decomposes them into technologies and human operators. Human operators
and technologies execute functions that are enabled by other functions and communication
media.Then, those functions are used to execute tasks. Finally, tasks are combined together
to enable operations. The functional decomposition is linked to the physical decomposition
through the functions.
Figure 2 presents a diagram of the decomposition of the elements of the model. The
terms used in this ontology are defined as follows:
 Facilities/Aircraft: This category groups physical pieces of equipment and/or peo-
ple located at the same place. A Facility refers to a building or place that provides
a particular service or is used for a particular purpose. For instance, the TRACON
facility refers to the physical building in which air traffic controllers work to direct
aircraft in the corresponding TRACON airspace. A facility can also refer to a simple
building, e.g. the building and mount for a radar or an Automatic Dependent Surveil-
lance - Broadcast (ADS-B) ground station.
An Aircraft refers to a vehicle that can fly and enter the controlled airspace, such as
an airplane, a helicopter or an unmanned aerial vehicle.
 Technologies: A Technology refers to a physical piece of equipment such as a
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transponder, a radar, etc. A technology is located in a facility or an aircraft and
executes one or several functions.
 Human Operators: A Human Operator refers to a human being qualified to
execute the tasks required by his position/job. Human operators include pilots, air
traffic controllers, traffic flow managers, etc. Human operators are located in facilities
or in aircraft and execute one or several functions.
 Communication Media: A Communication Medium refers to the transmission
channel or tool used to deliver information, such as radio waves in a given range of
frequencies, phone lines, etc.
 Functions: A Function refers to “a capability without a goal”, of a technology or
a human being. Transmitting information or displaying information on a screen are
examples of functions.
 Tasks: A Task refers to a tangible activity with a goal. A task is made possible
through by combining functions together. Monitoring aircraft position is an example
of task.
 Operations: An Operation refers to a tangible activity with a goal resulting from
the combination of several tasks. For instance, sequencing and merging is an oper-
ation that requires air traffic controllers to direct aircraft and pilots to follow ATC
instructions and fly the aircraft.
This decomposition enables the introduction of failures at different levels (Section 2.2.5).
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2.2.4 Influence structure and dimension
The influence structure of the ontology is the set of relationships and links existing be-
tween the different components of the ontology. The signification of the links between the
elements is presented in Table 1. The dimension corresponds to the type of relationship
existing between the linked blocks. The term origin refers to the block at the tail of the
arrow, and destination refers to the block located at the head of the arrow. The rela-
tionship “Hosts” means that the destination block is located inside the origin block. The
relationship “Executes” means that the origin block executes the destination block. The
relationship “Emits” means that the origin block emits information using the destination
block. The relationship “Transmits” means that the origin block transfers the information
to the destination block. The relationship “Enables” means that the origin block makes
the achievement of the destination block feasible. The relationship “Equivalence” does not
carry any dependence information. It is used to determine redundancy in the technologies.
The ontology has three types of links: primary, secondary and equivalence. The test
cases of section 2.4 provide diagrams for visual representation of those links with their
associated color code.
 Primary links: Primary links correspond to nominal interactions between the dif-
ferent components. They are represented by colored arrows: a green and plain arrow
indicates a link working nominally. A dashed orange link indicates that some of the
information nominally carried by the link is missing. A dotted red arrow indicates
the the link is no functional.
 Secondary links: Secondary links correspond to redundancies, not used in nominal
modes. They are also represented by colored arrows: when the link is inactive, it is
represented by a dashed gray line and when it is active, it takes the colors of a primary
link. For instance, the primary radar can be used as a backup for the secondary radar,
but it does not provide the same level of performance. The functions enabled by the
primary radar are contained in the ontology, but the links are listed as secondary,
since they are not used during nominal operations.
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 Equivalence links: Equivalence links connect blocks with similar characteristics.
They are represented by black dotted lines. Two technologies are equivalent if and
only if they are identical. If they are not identical, they can perform identical func-
tions which will have the equivalence relationship. Functions do not need to be exactly
identical to be equivalent. Two equivalent functions can have different levels of per-
formance. Equivalence links allow the ontology to find redundant systems to perform
failed functions.
2.2.5 Failures and degradations modes
The ontology enables the introduction of failures at all the levels of the decomposition.
Failures can affect single or multiple blocks but cannot be introduced on links, since links
have no physical meaning. The color of the links presented in the previous section refers to
the type and the availability of the information they carry. Failures can affect:
 Facilities/Aircraft: Failures affecting facilities and aircraft are potentially the
most difficult to handle, since they host many people and technologies. Such failures
can be total or partial. When a facility failure is total, it is propagated to technologies
and human operators located in this facility. When the failure is partial, only some
technologies or human operators will be set as “failed”. A total failure can be visu-
alized as a master switch for all the technologies and people in the facility. A partial
failure can be seen as a switch for a particular room.
 Technologies: A technology can fail because the facility in which it is located
fails, or because the technology itself fails. The same way facilities fail, technology
failures can be partial or total. If the failure is total, all the functions enabled by the
technology will be set to inoperative. If the failure is partial, only a set of functions
will be set to inoperative.
 Human Operators: Failures affecting human operators are modeled the same way
as failures affecting technologies.
 Communication Media: When a communication medium fails, the information it
22
carries cannot reach its destination. Therefore, the destination function of the links
exiting the medium will be disabled, because the information could not be transmitted.
 Functions: A failure cannot be introduced at the function level. If a technology or an
operator cannot execute a function, it is modeled as a partial failure of the technology
or operator. A function can fail if its input link(s) carry failures.
 Tasks: Tasks can fail by the propagation of functions failures. Failures at a task
level can also be introduced to model human errors. Task failures propagate to the
operation level.
 Operations: Operations can fail because of the propagation of tasks failures.
When a failure is introduced in the ontology, the failure is propagated throughout the
system by the links and its impact can be measured by an incapacity of executing tasks
and operations. Since links also carry partial failures, the ontology also allows to measure
decreases in performance.
2.3 Validation
This section presents a implementation of the ontology using MATLAB and Simulink. To
show the capabilities of the ontology, a limited ATMS was simulated. Matlab and Simulink
were chosen for the rapidity of prototyping. Simulink offers a great simulation environment
with interaction and communication between elements. The ontology was implemented in
Simulink, and a control panel module to introduce the failures and track their impact was
created using MATLAB. In this implementation of the ontology, there is no notion of time
and propagation time for the failure. This could be achieved by introducting delays along
the links of the Simulink model.
2.3.1 Simulink Model
In this implementation, yellow blocks represent facilities and aircraft. When going inside
those blocks, the technologies and human operators hosted by those facilities appear. The
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outputs of the technologies and operators are the functions accomplished. This Matlab-
Simulink implementation is deterministic. Future implementations may consider introduc-

































An automated MATLAB interface was developed together with the Simulink model. This
interface automatically reads the Simulink model and look for all the facilities, technologies,
etc. Figures 4 and 6 present the control panel with the facilities, technologies, operators
and their associated functions. The introduction of failures is enabled by check-boxes.
By unchecking one or several boxes, the corresponding components are set as inoperative.
Figures 5 and 7 present the control panel that shows the status of communication medias,
tasks and operations. In both control panels, a green background indicates a nominal state.
A red background indicates that the function,task or operation cannot be executed.
To validate the ontology, two test cases have been run, using two types of events com-
ing from the news. The first event consists of a loss of a radar, and the second event is
degradation due to poor weather.
2.3.3 Event 1: Loss of radar
2.3.3.1 Event description
Radars are key elements of the ATMS. In the event of a failure of one of them, operations
are dramatically affected. Radar failure is a relatively frequent event around the world:
Southern California TRACON radar [134] in May 2007, Dublin airport radar [55, 100] in
July 2008, a radar in Manila, Philippines, [105] in 2009, United Kingdom airspace radar [7]
in 2010, and a radar in Delhi, India [135] in 2010. The list is non exhaustive but shows the
frequency of such outages. From the cited articles, it was determined that the consequences
of a radar failure are that
 Inbound and overflying aircraft were diverted
 Departing aircraft were grounded
 System was working at reduced capacity
 Controllers could not obtain aircraft identification tags on their screens.
 Controllers could not obtain aircraft altitudes
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 The airport was shut down
 The backup system used was less performant as it did not handle flight plan informa-
tion
 No map of traffic was available to air traffic controllers
 Since no map was available, no vector could be given to aircraft.
2.3.3.2 Ontology results
The ontology was run with a failure introduced at the level of the facility for the secondary
radar. The radar appears as still active because the failure is introduced at the level of the
facility. Note that the functions of the radar (as a technology) are disabled. Figures 4 and 5
present the MATLAB interface when the secondary surveillance radar (SSR) is inoperative.
The cascade of failures affects principally the controller that cannot monitoring traffic since
its control station does not display aircraft’s positions. Aircraft’s mode-C transponder
will not broadcast the aircraft’s altitude since there were no such request, the secondary
surveillance radar being inoperative. The impact on tasks and operations is major since all
activities requiring air traffic control feedback cannot be executed anymore. The aircraft
are left on their own. The mitigation of such a scenario is developed in Chapter 4. The
ontology predicts the same impact on operations as the ones observed in the section 2.3.3.1.
The controllers cannot direct the aircraft nor deconflict them. The operations of sequencing,
merging and approach are unavailable, therefore no aircraft can safely fly in the considered
airspace. The controllers cannot identify the aircraft nor monitor traffic, because the control
station do not display aircraft position or altitude.
2.3.4 Event 2: Poor weather over SFO
2.3.4.1 Event description
Operations at San Francisco International airport (SFO) are highly constrained by the
weather. The FAA requires a minimum 4,300 ft runway separation for simultaneous par-
allel instrument landings [35]. SFO runways centerlines are only 750 ft apart (Figure 10).
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Figure 4: MATLAB interface - Technologies control panel for the ontology in the event of
a failure of the Secondary Radar
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Figure 5: MATLAB interface - Operations control panel for the ontology in the event of
a failure of the Secondary Radar
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Because of the substandard runway separation, during poor weather conditions, simulta-
neous landings are not permitted and the landing capacity is reduced from 60 landings
per hour on two runways to 30 landings per hour on one runway. During parallel landing
operations, one aircraft can use the Instrument Landing System (ILS) and the following
aircraft lands using VFR. When the conditions are poor, VFR landings are not possible.
2.3.4.2 Ontology results
The ontology was run with a failure introduced at the level of the FAA regulations, that
do not permit VFR landings. Figures 6 and 7 the MATLAB interface for this scenario.
The degradation propagates throughout the system and results in the first runway of the
airport becoming inoperative. Therefore, the operation consisting of parallel approaches is
unavailable. Chapter 3 presents an analysis of such a scenario at San Francisco International
Airport, when the fog causes the airport to run operations with only one runway active for
landings. The ontology predicts the same consequences as the ones observed in the real
system.
The two test cases presented validate the ontology and show its possible uses. The next
section present other test cases of failures founds in the literature.
2.4 Application of the ontology
This section presents two case studies to illustrate the uses of the ontology. The first case
illustrates the propagation of a failure of the barometric altimetry in one aircraft. The
second case shows how the ontology can be used to find alternative technologies in the
event of a GPS jamming.
2.4.1 Failure of the barometric altimetry in an aircraft
In this example, a failure is introduced in the barometric altimetry of an aircraft [142]. It is
assumed that the technologies providing this function, that is the barometric altimeters, are
inoperative. Figure 8 presents a simplified version of the ontology. The blocs are depicted
in red if they are the origin of the failure, or if this element has failed totally. A block
in orange is partially affected by the failure. It is visually easy to follow all the elements
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Figure 6: MATLAB interface - Technologies control panel for the ontology in the event of
poor weather
31
Figure 7: MATLAB interface - Operations control panel for the ontology in the event of
poor weather
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that completely failed and those which suffer of a loss of capabilities. Table 2 summarizes
how the failure propagates along the ontology. Only some blocks were selected to illustrate
the example. When the barometric altimeter fails, its main function, which is to measure
the pressure altitude is not available anymore. Then, the onboard Mode-S transponder
which broadcasts the altitude cannot obtain the altitude information and this information
cannot be broadcast over the 1090 MHz radio frequency. The radio waves do not carry this
information and therefore cannot be received by the ground-based Mode-S transponder,
which cannot display the information onto the displays of air traffic controllers. Since
the air traffic controller does not know the altitude of the aircraft, the task “surveillance”
cannot be fully achieved. Moreover, since the altitude is not available to the pilot or to
the autopilot, it is not possible for the aircraft to fly a holding pattern, which requires to
maintain a constant altitude. Finally, since the two tasks “surveillance” and “fly holding
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2.4.2 Jamming of the GPS Signal
Future operations will highly rely on accurate positioning using GPS. Super Density Op-
erations [72] will require aircraft to precisely follow predetermined trajectories consisting
of a sequence of way-points coordinates. GPS is necessary to ensure Required Navigation
Performance (RNP) operations. The automatic dependant system - broadcast (ADS-B)
literally depends on the aircraft being able to determine its position, in order to broadcast
it to ground stations and to other aircraft, using “ADSB in” and “ADS-B out” capabili-
ties. The advent of ADS-B might allow self separation for en-route traffic and eventually
in congested terminal areas. Such operations would be severely jeopardized in the event of
a failure or a jamming of the GPS system. Figure 9 depicts the impact of a GPS jam on
ADS-B operations. This representation is slightly simplified and is organized by entity for
a more compact view. This example presents only one direction of communication, that is
only aircraft 2 trying to determine the position of aircraft 1 using ADS-B. This example
shows how the traffic information service (TIS) could be used as a backup to ADS-B in
operations in terminal areas. The TIS is a first-generation traffic system that enables the
display of surrounding traffic in the cockpit, using information uploaded from 107 Mode S
terminal radars. The link between “ADS-B out” of aircraft 1 and “ADS-B in” of aircraft
2 is the primary link for aircraft 2 to obtain surrounding traffic’s information. If this link
fails, the secondary link is activated and the TIS is used as a backup system.
2.5 Summary
This chapter answers RQ 1 and RQ 2, that is, “What is the chain of events that results from
a failure in the ATMS?”, and “What is the impact of a failure on operations?” by presenting
a ontology for the air traffic system based on a physical and a functional decomposition of
the system. The ontology enables the tracking of failures throughout the ATMS and mesure
their impact on operations. The losss of capabilities is instantaneously evaluted.
The ontology links two decompositions: a physical decomposition and a functional de-
composition. The physical decomposition begins with facilities and aircraft, and decomposes
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Figure 9: Impact of GPS jamming on ADS-B operations
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communication media. The functional decomposition begins with operations and splits
them into tasks and then into functions. The functions are the meeting point between the
functional and the physical decompositions, since functions are executed by technologies or
human operators. Those functions can communicate via communication media. The dif-
ferent components of the ontology are linked together by different relationships that enable
the propagation of failures. Failures of systems or subsystems can be introduced at differ-
ent levels and their impact can be tracked all the way to the decrease of performances in
operations. The ontology is validated on two examples using a MATLAB-Simulink imple-
mentation. The results of the propagation of the failure through the implemented ontology
are compared with the consequences of similar failures in the real ATMS.
As new technologies are introduced to leverage new concepts of operation, this ontology
enables the study of their modes of failure and to find alternative solutions to ensure the
graceful degradation of the ATMS. This ontology answers the question “What is the chain
of events that results from a failure in the ATMS?” by instantaneously providing a clear
understanding of the propagation of the failure, the people, technologies, functions and
tasks that are affected. Ultimately, it answers the question “What is the impact the impact
of a failure on operations?” by bringing forward the loss of operational capabilities resulting
from a failure. This ontology can be used as a health monitoring tool for the entire ATMS.
For instance, in each control center, ARTCC or TRACON, the tool could be running and
be connected to sensors for each technology, facility, etc. In the event of the failure of one
of them, the manager of the control center could instantaneously evaluate the severity of
the situation and take appropriate mitigation actions.
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CHAPTER III
OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION CASE STUDY 1: DEGRADATION
OF AIRPORT LANDING CAPACITY
3.1 Introduction
This chapter addresses RQ 3 and RQ 4, that is “What is the sensitivity of traffic configura-
tions to potential degradations?” and “How can the smooth transition from nominal mode
of operations to degraded mode of operation be ensured?”, respectively. In this chapter,
the modeled degradation is a loss of landing capacity at San Francisco International Air-
port (SFO), as presented in section 2.3.4. This loss of capacity is the result of a runway
closure, most often due to weather in this case, but it can also result from an incident on
the airport surface. The sensitivity of the traffic configuration to a reduction in landing
capacity is measured as the aircraft congestion building up inside the TRACON. Terminal
Radar Approach Control (TRACON) areas constitute a critical airspace buffer around ma-
jor airports, which receive aircraft flows from adjacent centers and deliver highly structured
traffic flows to the arrival runways. TRACON facilities control the airspace surrounding the
largest 166 US airports [40]. The TRACON airspace is usually a cylinder of radius 30 to
50 NM and height 10,000 to 20,000 ft [144]. Inbound flows of traffic from adjacent centers
to the TRACON are regulated using the Traffic Management Advisor (TMA) [98, 79],
which protects TRACONs from unacceptable congestion, thereby alleviating the TRACON
air traffic controller’s workload. The TMA aslo time meters the arrivals of aircraft in the
TRACON in order to provide smooth flow of aircraft to the TRACON controllers. Never-
theless, unexpected events such as runway closures can disrupt the operations, leading to
congested TRACONs. TRACONs constitute one of the most vulnerable parts of the air
traffic control system as air traffic keeps growing. Reducing TRACONs traffic load to the
necessary minimum is a key safety matter. TMA provides an efficient solution to regulate
inflow of traffic to the TRACON. The results presented in this chapter complement the
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TMA by providing bounds for the inflow of traffic.
In this chapter, a queueing model for the TRACON is developed. There already exist
many queueing models for ATM applications. Several works focus on ground operations,
where the queueing process is more visible: all aircraft are present at the same time on
the ramps and taxiways, just landed or ready for departure. Idris proposed a queueing
model to predict taxi times [62]. Ground operations were also modeled by Pujet [116],
especially at Boston Logan Internation Airport. At the terminal airspace level, Vandevenne
and Lippert [140] proposed two algorithms to sequence aircraft and optimize delays in
the terminal area. The results showed that at airports with multiple runways, optmizing
the sequence of aircraft inboud for each runway could considerably improve the airport
throughput. Chen and Zhao presented a queueing model [14] to estimate delays at landing.
Chen and Zhao modeled the interarrival time between aircraft using a constant value plus a
random variable. The aim of this interarrival time probability distribution is to model the
spacing designed by controllers. The model presented in this chapter present similarities
with the one introduced by Pujet [116].
The first step towards answering RQ 3 is to model the system. Theoretically, runway
capacities can be calculated using analytical formulas and nominal separation standards.
In this chapter, those capacities are determined and analyzed through available TRACON
data. Then, a model for the TRACON that captures airport performance as a function of
the demand is presented. The model a simple queueing model where aircraft claim a time
slot when they enter the TRACON. The model is calibrated using data, i.e the distribution
of arrival times as well as travel times in the TRACON are computed from available data.
The airport performance is the effective landing capacity, which depends on the number
of runways in use. The proposed model is validated with San Francisco TRACON radar
tracks records.
Once the model is available, it becomes easy to measure the sensitivity of traffic config-
urations to degraded capacity, by varying the queueing policy. Then, a solution to ensure
a smooth transition from nominal to degraded mode of operation is proposed by determin-
ing the optimal number of aircraft present in the TRACON that maximizes the airport
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throughput while minimizing congestion.
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 presents the available data, and intro-
duces some definitions. In section 3.3, radar tracks are analyzed to determine the airport
and TRACON characteristics. Section 3.4 presents the model developed. Finally, before
the summary of the chapter, section 3.5 evaluates different queueing policies and determines
the optimal number of aircraft that should be simultaneously in the TRACON to ensure the
best degradation possible in terms of congestion, in the event of a loss of landing capacity.
3.2 Data presentation and definitions
3.2.1 Data source
The dataset used in this thesis was provided by the Aicraft Noise Abatement Office of San
Francisco International Airport (SFO). The dataset contains the track records of all the
flights in the Northern California TRACON (NCT) from January to September 2006. This
dataset is furthermore used in Chapter 5 and in Appendix A, for airspace monitoring and
trajectory clustering purposes.
3.2.2 Data selection
The presence of several airports – Oakland International Airport (OAK), San Francisco
International Airport (SFO), San Jose International Airport (SJC) and many small airports
– in a small perimeter such as San Francisco Bay implies dedicated routes for landings and
takeoffs for each airport in the TRACON. Figure 11 presents the major jet arrival and
departure routes in the San Francisco Bay area. Those routes are based on Standard
Instrument Departure (SID) and Standard Terminal Arrival Route (STAR) procedures.
Those routes decrease the available options to reroute aircraft. For practical reasons such
as fuel capacity and for financial reasons, it is required to minimize the number of waiting
aircraft and their waiting time. SFO (Figure 10) has four runways arranged in two sets of
parallel runways. The weather and the terrain configuration (presence of residential areas
located west, north and south of the airport) are such that the “West” configuration is
the most used in order to reduce the noise over residential areas. In that configuration,
aircraft take off on runways 01L/R, departing over the bay and land on runways 28L/R,
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maximizing the distance flown over the water in order to reduce the environmental impact
of noise. This study focuses on this configuration. The runway configuration of SFO is
such that departures and landings are on separate runways. During typical operations,
departures on runways 01L/R are sequenced to immediately follow arriving aircraft on
runways 28L/R. Basically, during parallel approaches, as soon as the aircraft landing on
runways 28L/R have cleared the intersection with runways 01L/R, the departing aircraft on
runways 01L/R are cleared for takeoff. Therefore, takeoffs are sequenced in such a manner
that they do not influence landings.
Figure 10: San Francisco International Airport diagram
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Figure 11: NCT standard traffic patterns, west configuration, image courtesy of Federal
Aviation Administration
3.2.3 Definitions
This study focuses on the arrival process at SFO. Hence, in this chapter, the term system
will refer to the TRACON area which is a 50 NM radius cylinder centered on Oakland
Airport and of height approximatively 20,000 ft. The inputs to the system are the aircraft
entering the TRACON, intending to land at SFO on 28L/R runways (Figure 10), and the
outputs are the aircraft actually landing on runways 28L/R at SFO. Runways 28R and 28L
are only 750 ft apart which does not allow simultaneous parallel instrument landings (FAA
rules require a minimum 4,300 ft runway separation for simulateneous independant parallel
landings) [35]. Hence, if the weather is not good enough for VFR landings, only one runway
can be used.
Different parameters can be used to define the behavior of the system. The evolution
of the outputs (landing traffic) can be analyzed as a function of the inputs (traffic entering
the TRACON) and parameters such as the number of runways in use. This behavior is also
characterized by the shape of aircraft trajectories as a function of the same parameters.
Each aircraft has a different track leading to the runway. The analysis is made on flattened
trajectories (2D trajectories on the x-y plan). Track are defined as straight or rerouted.
A straight track corresponds to the trajectory of an aircraft that could go directly from
its entering point in the TRACON to the runway threshold just following the way points.
A rerouted track corresponds to the trajectory of an aircraft that can not land directly
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and has to change its trajectory. It does not follow the nominal track and must follow a
curved trajectory or even holding patterns. Appendix A presents two trajectory clustering
algorithms to automatically classify trajectories. Figure 12 depicts several trajectories where
rerouting was identified.
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Figure 12: Different kinds of rerouted trajectories
3.3 Radar track analysis
To evaluate the behavior of the system, each track is analyzed in order to determine whether
it is a direct track or a rerouted one. To identify rerouted tracks, an algorithm for trajec-
tory clustering was developed. The algorithm is presented in appendix A. The rerouted
trajectories were then identified as outliers. Figure 13 presents the results of this algorithm
on a given day of arrivals at SFO (from 6 AM to 4 PM).
Figure 13(a) presents the tracks identified as direct tracks. Except some minor vectoring,
direct tracks head directly to the runway, following what is identified as typical operations
in appendix A. Figure 13(b) presents the tracks identified as rerouted. All those tracks
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Figure 13: SFO tracks analysis
contain a change of direction not corresponding to the route the aircraft should follow for a
nominal approach. The rerouting is done either by smooth changes of trajectory, e.g S-turns
corresponding to vectoring, or by important changes of trajectory, such as a holding pattern
(Figure 12). In the next section, the evolution of SFO arrival process is investigated in
two different ways. The first method is a time-based analysis and the second method is an
aircraft-based analysis.
3.3.1 Time-based method
In this method, the time is divided in periods of fixed length during which the following
elements are counted:
 The number of aircraft present in the system which corresponds to the number of
aircraft that are, at some point of this period, in the TRACON area (Figure 15(a)).
 The number of aircraft entering the system during this period.
 The number of aircraft landing during this period.
 The number of aircraft rerouted during that period.
It can be noted that the same aircraft can be counted as present and rerouted over several
time periods but enters or lands only once. It is said that only one runway is in use if
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during this time period, aircraft landed more than 75% of the time on the same runway.
Otherwise, two runways are in use
Figure 14 presents the results of the time-based analysis. Time is on the x axis. The
positive y axis is a number of flights while the negative y axis represents the fraction of
the total number of aircraft in the system that is rerouted, scaled from 1 to 10. Each bar
corresponds to a 15 min time period. The light blue bars represent the total number of
aircraft, the dark blue bars represent the number of aircraft entering the system, the red
bars represent the number of rerouted aircraft. Yellow indicates that only one runway is in
use while green stands for two runways.
Figure 14: Arrivals analysis: February 12, 2006, local time
As shown in Figure 14, in case of one runway in use, the number of rerouted aircraft
increases with the number of aircraft in the system. As soon as the second runway opens,
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the number of rerouted aircraft drops. In the two-runway configuration, even a peak of
incoming aircraft or a large number of aircraft present in the TRACON does not increase
the number of rerouted aircraft significantly. This method is more developed and used to
show the benefits of the McTDMA, in the paper of Idris and Evans [63]. The results they
present intend to show the benefits of McTMA and hence, take in account a much larger
traffic: they care for the demand to the airport and not only the aircraft currently in the
TRACON or soon entering it. In the case presented in Figure 14, there is no arrival after
5 PM because the airport configuration changed.
3.3.2 Aircraft-based method
The method presented in this section is based on an “aircraft-centric” point of view. The
flow of entering aircraft, the flow of landing aircraft, the number of aircraft present in the
system, and the number of aircraft rerouted are looked at. Those terms need to be well
defined. To calculate flows, a time period of length T is required. The term “for each
aircraft” means that the count has been done for all the aircraft contained in the data
set used. The total number of selected aircraft is around 95,000. Figure 15 presents a
comparison of counts for time-based methodology and the aircraft-based methodology.
 For each aircraft, the number of aircraft present in the system corresponds to the
number of aircraft that are, at some point, physically present in the TRACON at the
same time, as showin in Figure 15(b).
 For each aircraft, the flow of entering aircraft is equal to the number of aircraft entering
the TRACON during a period of length T centered on the time at which this aircraft
entered in the TRACON, divided by the period length T .
 For each aircraft, the flow of landing aircraft is equal to the number of aircraft landing
at SFO during a period of length T centered on the landing time of this aircraft at
SFO, divided by the period length T .
 For each aircraft, the number of rerouted aircraft that is equal to the number of
aircraft present in the system that have a rerouted trajectory.
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 For each aircraft, the number of runways used corresponds to an average over a period
of length T centered on the aircraft landing time. When one runway is used more
than 75% of the time during this period, it is said than only one runway is in use,




















(b) Aicraft-based method to count the number of aircraft present in the TRACON
Figure 15: Comparison of time-based method and aircraft-based method
Figure 16 shows the average flow of entering aircraft in the TRACON (green diamonds),
the average flow of landing aircraft (red crosses) and its standard deviation (vertical red
lines), and the average number of rerouted aircraft (blue stars), as functions of the number
of aircraft in the TRACON and of the number of runways in use. The blue line represents
the data frequency (i.e the number of occurence of this configuration). The length of the
period chosen is T = 15 min, to match the average time spent by aircraft in the system
which is 14 min 30 s. The following presents an analysis of the TRACON characteristics as
a function of the number of runways in use:
One runway in use: Up to 13 aircraft present in the TRACON, the flows of entering
and landing aircraft are very close and proportional to the number of aircraft in the
system. The average flow of entering aircraft is larger than the average flow of landing
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Figure 16: Aircraft-based analysis of landing and rerouting
aircraft. Past 14 aircraft present in the TRACON, the flow of landing aircraft remains
at 31 aircraft per hour whatever the number of entering aircraft and the number of
aircraft in the TRACON during the 15 min period. Up to 12 aircraft present in the
TRACON, the number of rerouted aircraft increases slowly. Past 13 aircraft present
in the TRACON, this number increases quickly and reaches 20 rerouted aircraft for
25 aircraft present in the TRACON. Past 25 aircraft in the system, the number
of rerouted aircraft stabilizes around 20. The cases over 25 aircraft present in the
TRACON are isolated cases (they happened once or twice in 9 month). The standard
deviation of the number of landing aircraft starts at 2.2 aircraft/hour and is almost
all the time around 4.5 aircraft/hour. In the modeling of the departure process by
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Pujet [116], the standard deviation for throughput is over 7 aircraft/hour.
Two runways in use: Up to 29 aircraft in the system, the flow of entering aircraft and the
flow of landing aircraft are almost the same . The number of landing aircraft increases
almost proportionally with the number of aircraft in the TRACON. When there are
more than 29 aircraft in the TRACON, the data frequency is very low (isolated cases)
so the results are not very relevant. The number of rerouted aircraft increases slowly
and reaches at the maximum 10 rerouted aircraft when 30 aircraft are present in the
system.
3.3.3 Airport characteristics
From figures 14 and 16 some characteristics of SFO can be extracted. First of all, the
analysis indicates that a single runway capacity a slightly exceeds 30 aircraft per hour.
This can be explained by the fact that the second runway could have been used a few time
during the period, and by the fact that the capacity of 30 aircraft can be over-achieved by
spacing the aircraft slightly closer than the regulation allows. In addition, the spacing time
between aircraft depends on their size. Therefore, a sequence of small aircraft will land in
a shorter time than a sequence of alterning large and small aircraft. The time required for
a small aircraft to land after a large aircraft is longer than the time required to land after
a small aircraft. Observe that when there are more than 15 aircraft in the TRACON, the
throughput saturates. When this limit is reached, the number of rerouted aircraft increases
very fast. The runway occupation is fully optimized and hence, aircraft have to be rerouted
to arrive at the exact time they have been assigned by the controllers. When the number
of aircraft entering the system is high, most of them have to be rerouted.
In the two-runway configuration, whatever the number of aircraft in the system, the
maximum airport arrival capacity is hardly reached. Hence, the number of rerouted aircraft
is not high. This configuration can handle a peak of arrivals or a large number of aircraft
in the TRACON without having to reroute hardly any aircraft.
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3.3.4 TRACON characteristics
From the analysis of figures 14 and 16, it is clear that once more than 15 aircraft are
in the system, the maximum landing capacity is reached. Allowing more aircraft in the
TRACON only leads to more aircraft rerouting. This increases the TRACON controller
workload, increases the density of aircraft and the airspace complexity and decreases the
available rerouting options. This notion of airspace complexity for terminal areas is further
developed in Chapter 5, section 5.3. While a minimum number of aircraft in the TRACON is
required to reach the maximum average landing capacity, exceeding that number, decreases
the TRACON safety and does not improve airport performance.
3.3.5 Pros and cons of both methods
3.3.5.1 Time-based method
Pros This method is easy to understand and to interpret. It is a common way to analyze
data. As shown in figure 14 the evolution of the number of rerouted aircraft as a function
of time is very clear.
Cons The time period is given and the start of the first period is chosen arbitrarily: it is
the first minute of the first day of records. Since it is arbitrary, some boundary effects can
appear and change the calculated values slightly. Figure 15(a) shows the impact of this
chosen time period.
3.3.5.2 Aircraft-based method
Pros The aircraft counted in the system correspond to the aircraft that interact which
each other, that is all the aircraft flying simultaneously in the TRACON. This has a real
meaning when talking about density or complexity. This method grants a very easy com-
parison of the results with a discrete event model. The analysis is exactly the same for all
the aircraft.
Cons For the number of aircraft in the system, only the aircraft flying in the TRACON
are taken into account: it is assumed that aircraft that have already landed and aircraft
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outside the TRACON do not have any influence on airborne aircraft.
3.4 Model description, calibration and validation
This section presents the developed model of the TRACON. One of the objectives of this
model is to capture the phenomena observed in TRACON. This queueing model presents
similarities with earlier push-back and departure process model [116].
3.4.1 Description of the model
This model is a discrete time input-output model implemented using MATLAB.
System: The modeled system is the TRACON together with two parallels runways. In
nominal configuration (i.e. the two runways are open and simultaneous landing are
possible), the maximum landing capacity is 60 aircraft per hour, 30 for each runway.
Inputs: The input of the system is the sequence of entering aircraft in the TRACON.
Outputs: The output of the system is the sequence of landing aircraft on the two runways.
Time: The time is divided into 30 s periods.
Travel time: When an aircraft enters the system, a nominal travel time is randomly drawn
with a probability distribution describing the configuration of the TRACON (i.e the
different possible routes leading aircraft from TRACON entry to the runway thresh-
old). This nominal time corresponds to the time the aircraft would spend in the
TRACON if the runway were not congested (Section 3.4.2).
Runway closure: To degrade the system, it is possible to close one or both runways. If a
runway is closed no aircraft can land on it.
Runway availability: Once an aircraft lands, the runway is unavailable for 2 minutes,
that is 4 time periods.
Runway attribution: When an aircraft enters the system and is given a nominal travel
time, drawn from a random distribution (Section 3.4.2), it requests the runway for
the 2 minutes period corresponding to the end of its travel time. If the runway is
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available, it can land and the runway becomes unavailable for this period. If no
runway is available for this period, the aircraft must enter a queue, modeling the
actual vectoring or rerouting.
Queuing: If the runway is not available, the aircraft waits until one runway is available.
As soon as one runway is available, the available slot is attributed to the aircraft.
3.4.2 Parameters for the model
This model is generic and can be used for any TRACON, but requires calibration for every
specific TRACON. The required parameters are the capacity of the runway(s) and the
average nominal time spent in the TRACON before landing. For the average nominal time
spend in the TRACON, the probability distribution used to draw nominal travel times is
presented in Figure 17. The gray shaded bars represent the travel time distribution for
unimpeded trajectories extracted from the first 8,000 flights of the data set (out of 81,000)
and the red line represents the probability distribution used for the model.
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Figure 17: Distribution of travel time in the TRACON
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3.4.3 Model validation
To validate the results of this model, the dataset used is the one presented in section 3.2,
excluding the 8,000 trajectories used for calibration. The sequence of entering aircraft
was extracted and used as input to the model. The number of open runways has been
extrapolated from the landing sequences in the data.
Figure 18 presents a simulation of the modeled system over two days. The top graph
presents the entering sequence, the second graph presents the runway occupancy: the dots
indicates the slots when the runway was occupied. The first runway, which is always open,
is indicated in red with value 1 and the second runway is indicated in blue with the value
−1. The green line presents the period where the second runway is open. The third graph
presents the evolution of the system. The blue line represents the number of aircraft in the
system and the red line represents the number of rerouted aircraft. The x axis is time, in
30 seconds time intervals. One day contains 2,880 time intervals of 30 seconds.
Figure 18: Evolution of the modeled system simulation over 2 days.
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For Figures 19 and 20, 250 days were simulated, corresponding to 67,218 aircraft, 22,428
landings when one runway is open and 44,790 landings when two-runways are open.
Figure 19 presents exactly the same analysis as in section 3.3.2 for the simulated model.
The figure plots the average flow of entering aircraft in the TRACON (green diamonds),
the average flow of landing aircraft (red crosses) and its standard deviation (vertical red
lines), and the average number of rerouted aircraft (blue stars), as functions of the number
of aircraft in the TRACON and of the number of runways in use. These terms are definded
in section 3.3.2. The continuous line represents the data frequency. For the model, the
period chosen is 16 minutes to capture the real flow of this discrete model.
Figure 19: Aircraft based analysis of landing and rerouting on the model
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Figure 20 presents the comparison between the model and the actual system. Figures
20(a) and 20(b) present the comparison of the landing flow of the model with the real system.
The blue line represents the average flow of landing aircraft as a function of the number of
aircraft in the system for the model and the red line presents the same information for the
real system. The vertical lines represent the standard deviation. Figures 20(c) and 20(d)
present the comparison of the landing flow for the model with the real system. The blue
line represents the average flow of landing aircraft as a function of the number of aircraft in
the system for the model and the red line presents the same information for the real system.
The vertical lines represent the standard deviation.










Flow of landing aircrafts, One runway in use
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(a) Flow of landing aircraft, 1 runway










Flow of landing aircrafts, Two runways in use
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(b) Flow of landing aircraft, 2 runways










Number of rerouted aircrafts, One runway in use
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(c) Number of rerouted aircraft, 1 runway










Number of rerouted aircrafts, Two runways in use
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(d) Number of rerouted aircraft, 2 runways
Figure 20: Comparison of landing and rerouting between the model and the real system
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As shown in figures 20(a) and 20(b), the behavior of the model is very close to the
real system, as far as landing aircraft flow is concerned. When one runway is in use, the
model predicts a flow slightly lower than the real system. When the number of aircraft
in the system is high, the average throughput is 30 landings/hour, which corresponds to
the regulation. Notice that the standard deviation of the capacities obtained by the model
and measured in the real system are always very close. When two runways are in use, the
model predicts exactly the same behavior as that of the real system up to 25 aircraft in the
system. Past 25 aircraft, there are some discrepancies. However this situation is infrequent
and represent only > 0.9% of total flights.
In the one-runway configuration, figure 20(c) shows that the predicted number of rerouted
aircraft is pretty accurate up to 10 aircraft in the system. Between 10 and 22 aircraft in the
system, prediction are slightly higher than the real system. Over 22 aircraft in the system,
the prediction keeps increasing at the same rate while in the real system, it stabilizes. On
the two-runway configuration, figure 20(d) shows that the prediction are accurate up to 20
aircraft in the system. Past 20 aircraft, it is slightly higher.
3.4.4 Analysis of the model results
The maximum number of aircraft present in the actual system exceeds 34 while it never
goes higher than 31 in the model. An explanation could be that there always is one runway
open in the model, whereas in the real system both runways can be closed simultaneously.
The model does not take in account weather constraints. It suffices that both runways
be closed during a few minutes and then both reopen to drastically increase the number
of rerouted aircraft, present in the system. In the model, one runway is always open to
remove the traffic congestion. In one-runway configuration, the model predicts the number
number of rerouted aircraft to increase with the number of aircraft in the system. In the
real system, it stops increasing. In the real system, only trajectory shapes changes were
accounted for: speed changes, which are also used by controller to regulate traffic were not
taken into account. This difference can also be explained by the fact that in the model,
when there is one runway in use, the second runway can absolutely not be used, while in
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the real system it can account for up to 25% of the landings. In the actual system, even
when the weather does not permit to use parallel landings, runways might be alternated to
increase capacity by slightly reducing time intervals between landings.
3.4.5 Possible model evolutions
 Once an aircraft lands, the time when the runway is unavailable is always exactly two
minutes. The aircraft type (light, medium, heavy) is not taken into account in this
model. In a future model, the unavailability time could be dependent on the aircraft’s
type. The size of the aircraft would be randomly drawn with a probability law based
on the real distribution of aircraft.
 Queuing and landing methods are very deterministic. When a plane is queuing, as
soon as the runway is available, the plane lands. It does not take in account the
dynamic of the aircraft and any event that could impact the precision on the landing
time. A small uncertainty could be added on the moment a plane lands [14].
 The model does not include different routes in the TRACON. The time spent in the
TRACON is randomly drawn with a certain probability law. This could be more rep-
resentative if the entering sequence were to include several entry points corresponding
to different routes with different travel time probability distributions for each route.
Some routes could be longer or more frequent.
3.5 TRACON operations sensitivity to landing capacity degradation
A study about the impact of the landing demand on landing capacity[63] for Newark Airport
shows that when demand is higher than the capacity of the runway, it results in a drop of
runway capacity. Plausible factors can be the application of traffic flow restrictions and
holding. Other factors may include a high workload of air traffic controllers and airspace
complexity constraints.
To measure the sensitivity of various traffic configurations on congestion and delays,
arrival simulations have been made using San Francisco demand sequence. The traffic con-
ditions studied are generated by modifying the TRACON queueing policy: The TRACON
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has been given a limited capacity: no aircraft can enter it if this limit is reached. As soon
as an aircraft lands, one aircraft waiting outside can enter the TRACON. Waiting time
refers to the time the aircraft were asked to wait outside the TRACON and rerouting time
corresponds to the time the aircraft were asked to wait for the runway to be available before
landing. The queue outside the TRACON is a First-In First-Out queue. The simulations
cover 243 days and 66,067 aircraft.
Figure 21 presents the results of simulation for TRACON limit capacity varying from
6 to 12 aircraft. Black bars stand for rerouting values and white bars for waiting waiting.
Figure 21(a) presents the average delay and figure presents the percentage of delayed aircraft
21(b).
(a) Mean rerouting and waiting time (b) Percentage of delayed flights
Figure 21: Simulated delays function of the number of allowed aircraft in the TRACON
Setting a low TRACON capacity has two effects. First, the number of aircraft waiting
outside the TRACON is very high and second, the runway capacity will not be reached,
which results in an inefficient configuration. Then, when the number of aicraft allowed in the
TRACON increases, the mean rerouting time decreases and stabilizes while the percentage
of delayed flight slightly decreases. When the allowed number of aircraft in the TRACON
varies from 9 to 12, the average rerouting time is almost the same, but, as the number
aircraft in the TRACON is smaller, the complexity of the system is smaller. The average
rerouting time does not change much, because the runway’s maximum capacity is reached
and aircraft have to queue anyway. As shown in section 3.3.2, past a certain number of
aircraft in the TRACON, the number of rerouted aircraft increases very quickly. If the
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number of simultaneous rerouted aircraft is high, the controller workload increases. An
analysis of the complexity related to rerouting and holding patterns is presented in Chapter
5. By reducing the controller workload, the controller could focus on fewer aircraft and
better optimize the trajectories, which would result in an increase of the runway capacity.
Moreover, the higher the number of present aircraft in a given area, the less the flexibility
for an efficient rerouting process is. TRACONs are very congested areas and limiting the
number of aircraft present in those areas would increase the safety without generating extra
delays. This work is a complement to the TMA, which regulates the flows of aircraft in the
TRACON. This section provides bounds on the number of aircraft TMA should allow in
the TRACON.
3.6 Summary
This chapter focuses on the operational impact of a degradation of the landing capacities
at SFO [44]. For that purpose, an input-output queueing model for the NCT is presented,
calibrated and validated using available radar data. The model accurately predicts the
landing capacity at SFO when the airport has either one or two runways in use. Then, the
model shows the influence of the number of aircraft simultaneously present in the TRACON
on the amount of rerouting that takes place within the TRACON.
The impact of a landing capacity reduction on traffic configurations was studied by
simulating the arrival process with different bounds on the TRACON capacity. It was
shown that allowing a large number of aircraft to enter the TRACON does not lead to
increased airport performance and may create the conditions for reduced airspace safety
margins. Past 9 aircraft, an increase in the number of aircraft simultaneously present in
the NCT does not have a positive effect on the delays encountered when one runway in use.
Limiting the number of aircraft in the TRACON does not increase average aircraft delay
but reduces the controller workload and the complexity of the traffic.
By analyzing various queueing policies, this chapter answers RQ 3, that is “What is the
sensitivity of traffic configurations to a potential degradation?”, in the case of a reduction
in landing capacity. It was shown that a reduction in landing capacity impacts the tracks
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of aircraft, because of vectoring and holding patterns. This rerouting has an impact on
airspace safety as it becomes more crowded, leaving less margin for errors. Then, RQ 4,
that is “How can the smooth transition from nominal mode of operations to degraded mode
of operation be ensured?” is answered by determining the optimal TRACON capacity.
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CHAPTER IV
OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION CASE STUDY 2: DEGRADATION
OF CNS SYSTEMS
4.1 Introduction
This chapter addresses RQ 3 and RQ 4, that is, “What is the sensitivity of a traffic configu-
ration to potential degradations?” and “How can the smooth transition from nominal mode
of operations to degraded mode of operations be ensured?”, respectively. This chapter pro-
vides an answer to those questions for a particular category of degradation. The potential
degradation of interest in this chapter encompasses degradations affecting the communi-
cation, navigation and surveillance systems (CNS). After modeling the operational impact
of such failures, different traffic configurations are probed. The model proposes a smooth
transition from nominal to degraded mode of operations by increasing the required spac-
ing distance bewteen aircraft. Finally, solutions to ensure the graceful degradation will be
proposed using an algorithm of avoidance under uncertainties in 3 dimensions.
Conflict resolution in the presence of uncertainties is the object of several papers. Kuchar
and Yang present several models to account for uncertainties in their review of conflict de-
tection and resolution modeling methods [74, 75]. They reviewed over 68 conflict detection
and resolution algorithms. Figure 22 presents the three fundamental trajectory extrapola-
tion methods used in conflict detection and resolution, and identified by Kuchar and Yang.
In the nominal case (Figure 22(a)) the current states are projected into the future along
a single trajectory, without direct consideration of uncertainties. In most cases, a nominal
trajectory model may be quite accurate but does not account for the possibility that an
aircraft may not behave as expected. It also does not account for position reporting errors.
The other extreme of dynamic modeling is the “worst case” projection (Figure 22(b)). From
an initial position and heading, the model assumes that the aircraft could perform any of
a range of maneuvers. If any of these maneuvers could cause a conflict, then a conflict
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is predicted. In the probabilistic method (Figure 22(c)), uncertainties are modeled to de-
scribe potential variation in the future trajectory of the aircraft. This model is used in the
URET [11] and CTAS [95], for example. A position error is added to a nominal trajectory,
from which the conflict probability can be derived [11, 67]. Another approach is to develop
a complete set of possible future trajectories, each weighted by a probability of occurring
(e.g. using probability density functions). The trajectories are then propagated into the
future to determine the probability of conflict [61, 84, 112].
(a) Nominal (b) Worst case (c) Probabilistic
Figure 22: Model of uncertainties
Erzberger et al. [30] also proposed a method for conflict detection and resolution in
the presence of uncertainties. The uncertainty on the trajectory is modeled using growing
ellipsoids centered on the aircraft’s position. The initial circles of avoidance are projected
forward in time and become ellipsoids. The major axis of the ellipsoid is aligned with the
velocity vector and the minor axis is perpendicular to it. This accounts mainly for an error
on the speed of the aircraft. Figure 23 presents the propagated ellipsoids for two aircraft.
To detect conflicts, a coordinate transformation is used resulting in an ellipsoid and an
error circle. The probability of conflict of the aircraft is computed using the volume of the
intersection of the ellipsoid and the error circle.
An approach to conflict resolution in the presence of uncertainties using dynamic pro-
gramming is proposed by Blin et al. [10]. This formulation tries to find the “optimal” time
to maneuver and the best maneuver possible to avoid conflict. This algorithm finds the
“optimal” maneuvers for an aircraft with a limited knowledge of other aircraft trajectories.
The uncertainty not only depends on the aircraft’s position, but on their intent and possible
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Figure 23: Uncertainty modeling by Erzberger et al. [30]
change of flight plan.
Literature on conflict resolution in the presence of uncertainties is pretty rich, but none
addresses the issue of a degradation in the CNS system. A degradation in the navigation
system might result in a slight deviation from the intended trajectory. A degradation of the
surveillance system would result in a decrease of accuracy in aircraft positions reporting.
The focus of this chapter is on the operational impact of degradation of communication,
navigation and surveillance systems. As seen in Chapter 2, it is difficult to accurately
measure the impact of a failure in one of those systems on operations. A model of the
operational impact of such a degradation is proposed. This model is conservative as it
encompasses many types of degradations affecting CNS systems. This model is then used
in section 4.3 to compare the sensitivity of two types of operations for arrivals: Free Flight
versus Miles In Trail. The probe used to compare those traffic configurations is a quasi-
optimal algorithm of avoidance in the presence of uncertainties, presented in section 4.4.
Then, a 3 dimensional version of the algorithm of avoidance in the presence of uncertainties
is introduced in section 4.5. The objective of this algorithm in 3D is to provide controllers
with a simple set of avoidance maneuvers in the event of a loss of performance in the
CNS system. The goal is not to optimize all avoidance maneuvers, but rather to focus on
airspace safety and to be able to handle a large number of aircraft simultaneously. A set of
maneuvers that solve all the potential conflicts in the case of growing radii of avoidance is
first determined and then, a single maneuver for each aircraft is chosen by formulating and
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solving a mixed integer program. The cost of each maneuver depends on the imminence of
the conflict.
4.2 Modeling the degradation of CNS systems
4.2.1 Degradation of CNS systems
The model presented in this chapter focuses on the impact of a degradation in the CNS
systems on aircraft separation requirements. Indeed, the primary mission of the air traffic
control system is to ensure safe aircraft separation under all regular and degraded circum-
stances. Conventional surveillance systems include radar-based technology, such as primary
and secondary radars, and ground-based beacons. New, higher-resolution surveillance sys-
tems are enabled by satellite-based positioning systems. Such technologies may enable
reduced horizontal separation minima and therefore higher airborne aircraft densities. In
the ontology presented in Chapter 2, a validation case involving the failure of a radar was
studied and the impact on operations was highlighted.
Figure 24: Super-Density operations [70]
The principle that drives this analysis can be sketched as follows: Considering a set of
aircraft operating under a “high performance” surveillance system, can safety be maintained
despite a failure of the surveillance system?
Assuming that failures of the surveillance system consist of a partial loss of vehicle
coverage, maneuvers that will allow aircraft to remain provably separated will be computed.
Indeed, partial or complete loss of aircraft position coverage results in growing uncertainty
about aircraft positions, in such a way that aircraft initially close to each other may not be
distinguishable from each other shortly after the failure, unless they maneuver to augment
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their physical separation. Thus, underpinning the analysis of the ability for a particular
airborne configuration to gracefully degrade, it is necessary to design procedures enabling
traffic to maintain provable separation under degraded conditions. The ability for such
configurations to gracefully degrade is measured using a conflict resolution strategy under
degraded conditions. In this chapter, such procedure will consist of a novel aircraft conflict
management algorithm.
Considering a planar traffic environment for simplicity, nominal and degraded operations
are defined as follows:
1. Nominal operations: Nominal operations consist of all allowable aircraft opera-
tions when the CNS systems are working properly. The nominal minimum aircraft
separation distance (expressed in nautical miles) will be denoted 2r0 .
2. Degraded operations: Degraded operations consist of all allowable aircraft oper-
ations when a failure has affected the CNS systems, and the reported position and
intent of aircraft are more uncertain or exceed a given threshold of uncertainties. The
degraded minimum aircraft separation distance (expressed in nautical miles) will be
denoted 2rf , with rf > r0.
Radar precision is one of the main reasons for deciding on specific aircraft separation
standards. The uncertainty in the position seen by the controllers leads to a separation
requirement that can be interpreted as a circle of avoidance around each aircraft. The circle
of avoidance corresponds to the area around the aircraft where no other aircraft and its circle
of avoidance is allowed. Its radius is generally 2.5 NM for en-route and 1.5 NM for approach.
The separation is guaranteed if the circles around each aircraft don’t intersect, resulting
in 5 NM or 3NM separation minima. This distance ensures safety if the position of the
aircraft is relatively well known and regularly updated. Accurate positioning systems such
as ADS-B will probably enable a reduction in allowable spacing distance [110]. If a failure
happens, the system works in degraded mode, resulting in an increase in uncertainties on the
aircraft position observed by the controller. As aircraft positions are known less accurately,
the resulting radius of avoidance must be increased. The growth of the avoidance circle is
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limited by backup positioning systems (Primary Surveillance Radars, radio...) that enable
controllers to get reports on aircraft positions. Such systems can be identified using the
ontology presented in Chapter 2. For instance, in the case of a radar breakdown, separation
distances must be increased to procedural separation standards [65]. The position of the
aircraft will be reported by the pilot to the controller by radio with a low update rate.
Between updates, the position of the aircraft is not known and its position uncertainty
increases with time.
4.2.2 Algorithmic aspects
From these considerations, it is not difficult to create aircraft configurations which are
conflict-free, yet will rapidly generate conflicts in case of positioning system degradation.
The following conflict detection and resolution algorithm will be used as a probe to evaluate
the configurations’ sensitivity to degradation. This section presents an overview of the
algorithm and mathematical details are explained in section 4.4.
In the remainder of this chapter, the surveillance system failure occurs at time t = 0
and the time of failure is known in real time. The resolution maneuver is an indicator for
the severity of the situation. Prior the failure time, nominal aircraft position accuracy will
translate into a circle of avoidance with radius r0.
Figure 25: Track of a growing circle of avoidance
Past the failure time (t > 0), the model for position uncertainties is time-varying,
whereby the radius of avoidance grows from r0 to rf > r0 over a given period of time.
Figure 25 presents the track of a growing circle of avoidance. For instance, r0 can be the
radius of avoidance provided by an ADS-B positioning system, while rf can be the one
67
provided by a Primary Surveillance Radar (PSR) . In the event of an ADS-B failure, the
transition from r0 and rf must be eventless, in the sense that the transition should not
jeopardize the safety of the overall traffic.
For each aircraft i, a constant growth rate ṙi is assumed, such that r(t) = r0 + ṙit.
Such a model approximately captures the growing, but bounded uncertainty on aircraft
position once the navigation system has failed. Such uncertainty might reflect the effect of
uncertainties on the aircraft heading (denoted ∆ψ) and on the aircraft velocity (denoted
∆Vi). Figure 26 shows the uncertainty on the trajectory. A simple way to connect these
uncertainties to the growing avoidance radius is to write, for example, the following first




2 ∆ψ + ∆V 2i .
Figure 26: Uncertainty on the trajectory
Figure 27 shows the difference between a classical conflict avoidance problem and the
problem under considerations in this paper. In the classical avoidance problem, the radius
of avoidance is constant. In this problem, the growing radius of avoidance makes the
formulation and resolution more complicated since it is time dependent.
When several aircraft are present within a given airspace sector, the conflict resolution
problem under degrading position uncertainty becomes much more complex. An approach
using mathematical programming based on a formulation originally presented by Pallotino
et al. [103] is introduced in section 4.4. The novelty of the presented algorithm is the
presence of growing radii of avoidance. It is not only a conflict detection and resolution,
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(a) Nominal conflict avoidance problem (b) Conflict avoidance problem with grow-
ing uncertainties
Figure 27: Comparison of conflict avoidance problems
but it also manages an increases in spacing distances. The problem is formulated as a
Mixed Integer Programming (MIP) and is implemented using the AMPL/CPLEX linear
programming tool set [42, 64].
4.3 Free Flight versus Miles-In-Trail degradation analysis
The parts of airspace where the highest aircraft densities occur are the terminal areas in the
vicinity of airports. Therefore, these constitute an ideal setting for evaluating the ability
for traffic to undergo graceful degradation. This choice is also motivated by current vistas
on future operations in terminal areas, which have been named “Super-Density operations”
(NextGen) and “High Complexity Terminal operations” (SESAR). Both consist of increas-
ing the airspace capacity around busy airports. A solution proposed in SESAR [125] is
the multiple merge points arrival operation shown in Figure 28. One way to interpret this
solution is to assimilate the new mode of operation to a “Free-Flight” scenario, whereby
the route structure in the terminal area is relaxed and the only constraint on incoming air-
craft is for them to meet a specific arrival time at the merge point. This scenario contrasts
sharply with current airport arrival practices, where high-density arrival flows of aircraft are
organized tens or even hundred of miles prior to landing, by lining up aircraft along arrival
routes and spacing them appropriately. Such operations are often denoted Miles-In-Trail
(MIT) operations.
For that purpose, a scenario considered involves 8 aircraft merging to a common point of
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Figure 28: Arrival Routes, Multiple Merge Points [125]
coordinates (0, 0). All aircraft are time separated: Each aircraft is given an arrival time so
as to meet a precise and regular arrival rate at the merge point. Assuming all aircraft fly at
the same speed of 200 kt, the aircraft must therefore be initially located on regularly spaced
circles centered at the merge point, as shown in Figure 29. The inter-aircraft spacings are
designed to emulate future Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC) arrival operations
on closely spaced parallel runways, such as San Francisco Airport: As observed in chapter 3,
the average interarrival time for each runway is slightly less than 2 minutes. This translates
into a 3NM average separation between aircraft when they fly at 200 kt and the two runways
are in use. This separation also turns out to be a very conservative estimate of separation
requirements for satellite-based navigation systems [110], leading us to an initial circle of
avoidance of radius r0 = 1.5NM as proposed by ICAO for ADS-B[66]. The final radius of
avoidance was chosen to be rf = 2.5 NM to reflect the surveillance degradation that would
occur, should a GPS-based surveillance fail and backup radar-based technology be used.
The rate of growth reflects a heading uncertainty ∆ψ = 5◦, leading to ṙ = 0.29 NM/min.
The transition time between r0 and rf is T = 3.44 min.
To evaluate the impact of changing arrival operations from Mile-In-Trail towards Free
Flight, aircraft will fly on an “arrival cone” whose vertex is at the merge point. When
the cone’s angular width is zero or takes small values, it corresponds to highly structured
Miles-In-Trail operations. When the cone’s angular width is large, it corresponds to less
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structured, Free-Flight-like operations.
To understand the impact of the cone angular width and the aircraft initial separations
on traffic degradation, should a surveillance system failure occur, the angular width was
varied from 10◦ to 55◦. The initial aircraft separation, that is, the distance between two
consecutive circles, was chosen to be 3.05 and 3.5 NM. A total of 1,650 cases with different
arrival angles have been simulated. The following procedure has been used to generate the
cases: Since the distance of each aircraft to the merging point is known (fixed separation
distance), the aircraft initial heading was picked at random, using a uniform probability
distribution in the allowed interval (±5◦, ±10◦, . . .). Figure 29 presents on the same diagram
a MIT configuration and a FF configuration. The circles represent the avoidance circles
(dashed/black = MIT, continuous/red = FF). They have initial radius 1.5 NM and are
centered on the aircraft. The blue line shows the aircraft’s heading. Aircraft are represented
by a small circle for the MIT configuration and asterisks for FF configuration. The allowed
arrival cone for the FF configuration is the shaded cone shown in Figure 29.
Figure 29: Free Flight and Miles-In-Trail arrival configurations
These traffic configurations have been probed by the conflict resolution algorithm under
uncertainties developed in section 4.4. Let S be the set of all generated cases. The severity
of the traffic management degradation on the traffic situation s ∈ S was evaluated by
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measuring the average deviation ms required for each aircraft, denoting ψis0 the initial
heading of aircraft i and ψis its heading after resolution in this situation. The average
deviation for a traffic configuration is
ms =
∑n
i=1 |ψis − ψis0|
n
, (1)
where n is the number of aircraft. All the cases were then sorted by absolute value of the
maximum aircraft arrival angle and grouped in parameter increments of 2.5◦. Let Sk denote
the following subsets of S:
S5 =
{
s ∈ S such that max
i





s ∈ S such that max
i
{ψis0} ∈ [k − 2.5, k), i = 1 . . . n
}
, k = 7.5, 10, . . . , 30. (3)
Figure 30 presents the results of the analysis for the initial distances of 3.05 NM in blue
and for an initial distance of 3.5 NM in red. The blue and red line correspond to the average
deviation required and the vertical bars represent the standard deviation. The best and
worst cases constitute the envelope of the blue and red shaded areas. The initial separation
distance can be interpreted as a time separation of the aircraft at the runway threshold.
The ratio between distance due to the time separation and the diameter of the circle of
avoidance is an important parameter for this study and will be denoted D0r0
Although the figure suffers from sampling irregularities, the following general trend may
be observed:
 At small arrival angles, that is in Miles-In-Trail like configuration, there is a very
high sensitivity to D0r0 . When D0 and r0 are very close, the amplitude of the required
maneuvers can vary from 10.5◦ up to 27◦. There is a very high variability. When D0
is larger than r0, there is less variability and the required deviation is between 8
◦ and
11◦ with a low variability.
 When the arrival cone angle increases, that is in Free-Flight like configuration, the
impact of the ratio D0r0 is less noticeable.
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Figure 30: Evolution of the deviation required for initial separation distance of 3.05 NM
and 3.5 NM
 For the case r0 = 3.05 NM, the variability of the required deviation is quite constant
and the average initially decreases as the angle of arrival increases, and then remains
constant.
 For the case r0 = 3.5 NM, the variability of the required deviation slightly increases
as the arrival cone angle increases.
To conclude, Free Flight or Miles-In-Trail do not appear to be significantly different
from the stand point of surveillance degradation. The important parameter in this study
is the ratio D0r0 . Having a buffer between the circles of avoidance allows for smaller avoid-
ance maneuvers. However, these conclusions were reached using computer-based conflict
management, which may differ from human-based conflict management.
Figures 31 and 32 show the avoidance maneuvers for the worst cases of S5 and S30 with
3.5NM initial separation. Figure 31(a) and 32(a) present the configuration at t = 0. Aircraft
are at the position where the avoidance maneuver is calculated. The aircraft trajectories for
t < 0 are represented and the line pointing out of the aircraft represent the new aircraft’s
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heading.
(a) t = 0 min (b) t = 3 min
Figure 31: Avoidance maneuvers for the worst case of S5
(a) t = 0 min (b) t = 3 min
Figure 32: Avoidance maneuvers for the worst case of S30
4.4 A near-optimal algorithm of avoidance under uncertainties
This section presents the algorithm used to solve the problem of conflict resolution under
growing position uncertainties when several aircraft are present. A typical Mixed Integer






subject to A1x+A2z ≤ b
where f1 ∈ Rm, f2 ∈ Rn, x ∈ Rm, z ∈ {0, 1}n. A1 ∈ Rl×m, A2 ∈ Rl×n, b ∈ Rl. m is
the number of real variables, n is the number of binary variables and l is the number of
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constraints. The next section focuses on developing a MIP model for the conflict resolution
problem of interest in this paper.
Consider a set of n aircraft in a planar space. Each aircraft i, i = 1, · · · , n is defined by
its position (xi, yi), its heading ψi and its speed Vi.
The relative velocity V ij and speed Vij of aircraft i with respect to aircraft j, and the
distance Dij between aircraft are given by:
V ij = [(Vxi − Vxj ), (Vyi − Vyj )]T (4)
= [Vi cosψi − Vj cosψj , Vi sinψi − Vj sinψj ]T , (5)
Vij =
√
(Vi cosψi−Vj cosψj)2+(Vi sinψi−Vj sinψj)2, (6)
Dij =
√
(xi − xj)2 + (yi − yj)2. (7)
See also Figure 33. Let define some useful parameters for the avoidance problem. Let ψij
be the angle between the relative velocity V ij and the x-axis, ωij be the angle between the
connector of the aircraft and the x-axis. Finally, let γij be the angle between the connector
of the aircraft and a line starting from aircraft i and tangent to a circle of radius 2r and





Vi sinψi − Vj sinψj











The conflict resolution problem arising in this chapter is solved using a single heading
change. The originality of this problem lies with the fact that the allowable miss distance
between the two aircraft is time-dependent. Namely, at time t = 0, the minimum miss









Figure 33: Problem configuration
where ṙ is the rate of growth of the circle of avoidance. For t ≥ T , the miss distance
is constant and equal to 2rf . Figure 34 illustrates the conflict avoidance constraint in a
relative frame of reference. For no conflict to occur, the circle C of radius 2r0 and centered
on aircraft j must not intersect the area enclosed by the contour C2. This contour C2 can
be seen to be the union of the half line P1, the circular segment P3 and the line segment
P2 and their symmetric images across the line passing though aircraft i and parallel to the
velocity V ij .
Figure 34: Avoidance constraints
For the purpose of linearization, the contour C2 is approximated by means of line seg-
ments, not to be intersected by the circle C. The first, obvious linear approximation is to
ask that the circle C not intersect either the gray stripe in figure 34, or the hatched cone
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whose vertex is aircraft i. Those conditions can be geometrically expressed as follow:
 Asking that the circle C not intersect the gray stripe is a classical conflict avoidance
problem that was developed and solved by Pallottino et al. in [103]. This problem
deals with time t ≥ T , when enough time has elapsed for the two radii of avoidance
to be equal to rf . The avoidance problem presented in figure 34 consists of finding a
change of heading for aircraft i and j such that the line parallel to V ij and tangent to
the circle of radius 2(rf − r0) centered on the relative position of aircraft i to aircraft
j at time T , does not intersect the circle of radius 2r0 centered on aircraft j. This
problem is equivalent to the line directed along V ij and passing through aircraft i not
intersect a circle of radius 2rf and centered on aircraft j. The avoidance constraints
are then:

ψij − ωij > γ̃ij
or







 Asking that the circle C not intersect the hatched cone can be detailed as follows,
referring back to figure 34. The angular width 2αij of the cone depends on the





If ṙi + ṙj > Vij , the sum of the radii of the avoidance circles increases faster than the
aircraft go away from each other. Whatever the relative velocity, the circles are bound
to intersect each other. Hence, the cone of avoidance is the entire plan: as arcsinαij
is not defined, then αij = π. If ṙi + ṙj = Vij , the rate of increase of the circle of
avoidance is the same as the relative speed. Hence, the avoidance cone is a half plane
perpendicular to the relative velocity and αij =
π
2 . The distance between the circles





Figure 35: Configuration in the relative frame of reference: cone avoidance
are first ordered so that −π2 ≤ ωij ≤
π
2 . Then, the condition of avoidance between
two aircraft is given by a condition on angles,
for −π ≥ ψij − αij and ψij + αij ≤ π:
ψij − ωij − αij > γ̂ij
or
ψij − ωij + αij < −γ̂ij ,
(12)
for ψij − αij < −π:
ψij − ωij − αij + 2π > γ̂ij
and
ψij − ωij + αij < −γ̂ij ,
(13)
and for π < ψij + αij :
ψij − ωij − αij > γ̂ij
and







Figure 35 presents those avoidance constraints. To avoid any singularity due to angles
around ±π, it is ensured that −π2 ≤ ωij ≤
π
2 . To do so, aircraft are ordered in function
of their position (xi, yi) so that x1 ≤ x2 ≤ . . . ≤ xn and if xi = xi+1, yi < yi+1.
The description of the avoidance constraints could be left at that point. However, the
developed constraints are somewhat conservative. For example, as shown in figure 36, the
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circle C may intersect the cone and the gray stripe without intersecting C2. To improve the
solution, a new constraint is introduced. Ideally, it would be the tangent (`1) to C2 at point
A and ask that it does not intersect the circle C. In the relative frame of reference, `1 has
a slope ψij − αij2 . Requiring `1 not intersect C2 is equivalent to requiring `3 not intersect
the circle centered on aircraft j and of radius (2r0 + |AD|). To formulate the constraint,
the distance |AD| is used. This distance is 2(rf − r0) − VijT sin
αij
2 . This distance is a
non linear function of ψi and ψj as Vij and αij are non linear with respect to ψi and ψj .
This function depends on too many parameters to be linearized easily. Nevertheless, this
constraint can be approximated by using `2: the line of slope ψij − αij2 passing through a
point between A and B. For that, a majorant to |DA| needs to be found. The following
















= rf − r0. (17)
Hence, it brings
DA = EA− ED (18)
< rf − r0. (19)
This leads to the constraint that the line of slope
αij
2 not intersect the circle of radius
2r0 +
rf−r0
2 = r0 + rf : it is captured by the constraints
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for −π ≥ ψij − αij2 and ψij +
αij
2 ≤ π:








for ψij − αij2 < −π:








and for π < ψij +
αij
2 :













4.4.2 Optimization of the conflict resolution
The previous section presented constraints that should be satisfied by the aircraft headings
to avoid a conflict. These constraints may be incorporated in an optimal conflict resolution
scheme. Denoting ψi0 the initial heading of the aircraft i and ψi its heading after resolution,
the problem is to compute:
min J(ψ1, ψ2, . . . ψn) = min
∑
i=1...n






−π ≥ ψij − αij
and
ψij + αij ≤ π
or (13) if ψij − αij < −π
or (14) if π < ψij + αij
or (20) if






or (21) if ψij − αij2 < −π
or (22) if π < ψij +
αij
2
i = 1 . . . n− 1, j = i+ 1 . . . n,
where n is the number of aircraft.
4.4.3 Formulation when speeds are identical
For the sake of computational simplicity, it is assumed all aircraft share the same speed
V . This assumption simplifies the formulae for ψij and αij and allows to obtain piecewise
linear formulation for psiij and a linearization for αij .
4.4.3.1 Expression of the cone angular width 2αij in the relative frame of reference
This section presents the formulas to determine the cone angular width 2αij when aircraft
share an identical speed. Rewriting ṙi = ṙ, i = 1 . . . n leads to
αij = arcsin
2ṙ√
V 2(cosψi− cosψj)2+V 2(sinψi− sinψj)2
= arcsin
ṙ







The half cone angular width αij is given by equation (24) and it is a non linear function
of ψi − ψj . This function is symmetric about ψi − ψj = 0 and consists of two quasi convex
components, separated at ψi−ψj = 0, as shown in Figure 37. The epigraph of each of these
quasi convex components can be approximated by the intersection of linear constraints
defined by their slopes ak and intercepts bk. Using the big-M method allows us to account
for the presence of two disconnected components, and this linearization leads to:












Figure 37: αij function of ψi − ψj and the linearization used

a1(ψi − ψj) + b1 ≤ αij
a2(ψi − ψj) + b2 ≤ αij
...
al(ψi − ψj) + bl ≤ αij
(25)
or (26)
−a1(ψi − ψj) + b1 ≤ αij
−a2(ψi − ψj) + b2 ≤ αij
...
−al(ψi − ψj) + bl ≤ αij .
(27)
4.4.4 Mixed Integer Linear Programming formulation
The global algorithm consists on minimizing expression (23) subject to all the constraints
previously developed. The constraints were written in AMPL format and solved using
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CPLEX. The or conditions can be transformed to and conditions, by using the big-M
formulation [43]. An example of such formulation can be found in [103]. Another option is
to use if − then− else conditions that are now handled by AMPL. MATLAB was used to
generate the 1,650 cases and was also used for the post-processing. The computing time to
solve an 8 aircraft configuration ranged from less than a second to a minute on a 4-processor,
Pentium class computer.
4.4.4.1 Expression of the angle of the relative velocity: ψij
Using the assumption of identical speed, the angle between the relative velocity and the















ψij is a function of ψi + ψj and ψi − ψj . It can be shown that ψij is a piecewise affine
function of ψi + ψj and ψi − ψj of the form ψij = mij(ψi + ψj) + pij . The value of mij if
always 12 and the values taken by pij are summarized in table 3.
Table 3: Intercept coefficient of ψij
Case 1 ψi − ψj < 0 and −2π ≤ ψi + ψj < −π pij = 3π2
Case 2 ψi − ψj < 0 and −π ≤ ψi + ψj < 2π pij = −π2
Case 3 ψi − ψj ≥ 0 and −2π ≤ ψi + ψj < π pij = π2
Case 4 ψi − ψj ≥ 0 and π ≤ ψi + ψj < 2π pij = −3π2
The value of pij can be computed using boolean variables. Let bCaseDiffPosij ,
bCaseSumInfmPiij , bCaseSumSupPiij , bCase1ij and bCase4ij be boolean variables such
that:
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bCaseDiffPosij = 1⇐⇒ ψi − ψj ≥ 0 (29)
bCaseSumInfmPiij = 1⇐⇒ −2π ≤ ψi + ψj < −π (30)














Those boolean variables yield the following expression for pij and hence ψij :




+ (bCaseDiffPosij − 12)π + 2π(bCase1ij − bCase4ij), (36)
which is linear in ψi and ψj and in the boolean variables.
4.4.4.2 Constraints formulation for ψij
The following formulation uses the big-M method. M is a large number such that if
multiplied by a boolean set to 1, the constraint is always satisfied, whatever the value of
the other variables. This enables us to select between constraints and use or relationship
between constraints. This is a standard procedure described in [43].
Determination of the sign of ψi − ψj :
bCaseDiffPosij = 1⇐⇒ {
ψi − ψj −MbCaseDiffPosij < 0,
−ψi + ψj −M(1− bCaseDiffPosij) < 0.
(37)
Determination of the boolean bCaseSumInfmPiij if ψi + ψj < −π:
bCaseSumInfmPiij = 1⇐⇒{
ψi + ψj + π −M(1− bCaseSumInfmPiij) < 0,
−ψi − ψj − π −MbCaseSumInfmPiij < 0.
(38)
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Determination if ψi + ψj ≥ π:
bCaseSumInfmPiij = 1⇐⇒{
−ψi − ψj + π −M(1− bCaseSumSupPiij) ≤ 0,
ψi + ψj − π −MbCaseSumSupPiij ≤ 0.
(39)
Determination of the boolean bCase1ij :
bCase1ij = 1⇐⇒{
−1.5 + bCaseDiffPosij − bCaseSumInfmPiij + 2bCase1ij ≤ 0,
−0.5− 2bCaseDiffPosij + bCaseSumInfmPiij − bCase1ij ≤ 0.
(40)
Determination of the boolean bCase4ij :
bCase4ij = 1⇐⇒{
1.5− bCaseDiffPosij − bCaseSumSupPiij − 2(1− bCase4ij) ≤ 0,
−1.5 + bCaseDiffPosij + bCaseSumSupPiij − bCase4ij ≤ 0.
(41)
Determination of the boolean bA1ij :




2 + bCaseDiffPosij)− 2π . . .
(bCase1ij + bCase4ij + αij)−M(1− bA1ij) ≤ 0,
−ψi+ψj2 − π(
1
2 + bCaseDiffPosij) + . . .
2π(bCase1ij + bCase4ij + αij)−MbA1ij ≤ 0
(42)
Determination of the boolean bA2ij :
bCase4ij = 1⇐⇒ 
−ψi+ψj2 − π(bCaseDiffPosij −
3
2) + 2π . . .
(bCase1ij + bCase4ij + αij)−M(1− bA2ij) ≤ 0,
ψi+ψj
2 + π(bCaseDiffPosij −
3
2)− . . .
2π(bCase1ij + bCase4ij + αij)−MbA2ij ≤ 0
(43)





2 + bCaseDiffPosij)− 2π . . .
(bCase1ij + bCase4ij +
αij
2 )−M(1− bB1ij) ≤ 0,
−ψi+ψj2 − π(
1
2 + bCaseDiffPosij) + . . .
2π(bCase1ij + bCase4ij +
αij
2 )−MbB1ij ≤ 0
(44)
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Determination of the boolean bB2ij :
bCase4ij = 1⇐⇒
−ψi+ψj2 − π(bCaseDiffPosij −
3
2) + 2π . . .
(bCase1ij + bCase4ij +
αij
2 )−M(1− bB2ij) ≤ 0,
ψi+ψj
2 + π(bCaseDiffPosij −
3
2)− . . .
2π(bCase1ij + bCase4ij +
αij
2 )−MbB2ij ≤ 0
(45)
4.4.4.3 Cone angular width 2αij in the relative frame of reference
Using the big-M method, the expression of αij in equation 4.4.3.1 can be rewritten as:
a1(ψi − ψj) + b1 −MbCaseAlphaPosij ≤ αij
a2(ψi − ψj) + b2 −MbCaseAlphaPosij ≤ αij
...
al(ψi − ψj) + bl −MbCaseAlphaPosij ≤ αij
−a1(ψi − ψj) + b1 −M(1− bCaseAlphaPosij) ≤ αij
−a2(ψi − ψj) + b2 −M(1− bCaseAlphaPosij) ≤ αij
...
−al(ψi − ψj) + bl −M(1− bCaseAlphaPosij) ≤ αij
(46)
with bCaseAlphaPosij a binary variable used to transform the or between the con-
straints in an and relationship.




2 − bCaseP lusij)π + ωij + αij . . .





2 − bCaseP lusij)π − ωij + αij . . .
+γ̂ij −M(1− bCaseIneqPosij) < 0
(47)
with bCaseIneqPosij a binary variable used to transform the or between the constraints
in an and relationship.
4.4.4.4 Mixed constraints for conflict avoidance
The conflict avoidance constraints given by equation 24 can be handled in a linear program-





2 − bCaseP lusij)π + ωij + γ̃ij . . .




2 − bCaseP lusij)π − ωij + γ̃ij . . .
−2π(bCase4ij − bCase1ij)−M(1− bCaseIneqPosij + bK1ij) < 0,
−ψi+ψj2 + (
1
2 − bCaseP lusij)π + ωij + γ̂ij . . .




2 − bCaseP lusij)π − ωij + γ̂ij . . .
+αij − 2π(bCase4ij − bCase1ij)−M(2− bCaseIneqPosij − bA0ij + bK2ij) < 0,
−ψi+ψj2 + (
1
2 − bCaseP lusij)π + ωij + γ̂ij . . .




2 − bCaseP lusij)π − ωij + γ̂ij . . .
+αij − 2π(bCase4ij − bCase1ij + bA2ij)−M(bA0ij + bK2ij) < 0,
−ψi+ψj2 + (
1
2 − bCaseP lusij)π + ωij + γ
∗
ij . . .
+
αij




2 − bCaseP lusij)π − ωij + γ
∗
ij . . .
+
αij
2 − 2π(bCase4ij − bCase1ij)−M(2− bCaseIneqPosij − bB0ij + bK3ij) < 0,
−ψi+ψj2 + (
1
2 − bCaseP lusij)π + ωij + γ
∗
ij . . .
+
αij




2 − bCaseP lusij)π − ωij + γ
∗
ij . . .
+
αij
2 − 2π(bCase4ij − bCase1ij + bA2ij)−M(bB0ij + bK3ij) < 0,
bK1ij + bK2ij + bK3ij = 2,
bA0ij + bA1ij + bA2ij = 1,
bB0ij + bB1ij + bB2ij = 1,
(48)
with bA0ij , bB0ij , bK1ij , bK2ij and bK3ij binary variables to choose among avoidance
mode.
The global algorithm consists on minimizing expression 23 subject to all the constraints
previously developed. The constraints were written in AMPL format and solved using
CPLEX.
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4.4.4.5 Minimization of the objective
The objective of this problem is to minimize the total deviation as stated in equation 23.
Introducing a new variable AbsV ali for each aircraft, minimizing the absolute value of the
deviation considering that −π < ψi ≤ π, can be reformulated as follow






−ψi + ψ0i + π −M(1− bSupPii) < 0
ψi − ψ0i − π −MbSupPii ≤ 0
ψi − ψ0i + π −M(1− bInfmPii) < 0
−ψi + ψ0i − π −MbInfmPii ≤ 0
2πbInfmPii + ψi − ψ0i −MbSupPii ≤ AbsV ali
2πbSupPii − ψi + ψ0i −MbInfmPii ≤ AbsV ali
(50)
Where bSupPii and bInfmPii are boolean variables used for modulo purposes when
the deviation ψi − ψ0i is greater or smaller than ±π.
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4.5 Algorithm of avoidance under uncertainties in 3 dimensions
This section presents a new formulation for the algorithm of avoidance in the presence of
uncertainties, in order to extend it to 3D. The algorithm minimizes the number of maneuvers
required to maintain the safety of the airspace under degraded conditions. Uncertainties are
still modeled as an increase in the required separation distance between aircraft, as presented
in section 4.2. A single maneuver for each aircraft is chosen to maintain safe separation.
Maneuvers include heading changes, speed changes and flight level changes. Maneuvers
are simple to execute and guarantee a conflict-free configuration after execution. Their
feasibility is constrained by weather avoidance, sector boundaries and aircraft performance.
A Mixed Integer Program is used to determine the set of maneuvers to be executed.
4.5.1 Algorithm overview
Consider a system of n aircraft in a 3-dimensional Cartesian airspace. The flat earth
approximation is valid for the distances considered in this section. The set of all aircraft
in the airspace is denoted S. The horizontal position of aircraft i is (xi, yi) and its vertical
position is given by its flight level FLi. Its speed, heading and vertical speed are Vi, ψi, and
Vzi respectively. The algorithm is intended for en route traffic.
An overview of the algorithm is first presented, before giving more details:
1. Organize aircraft by flight level.
2. Determine, for each aircraft i, the set of feasible maneuvers Mfeasi (performance,
weather, sector boundary, flight level change constraints).
3. Determine, for each pair of aircraft (i, j), the subset Kij ⊆Mfeasi ×M
feas
j of combi-
nations of feasible maneuvers Kklij that do not lead to a conflict.
4. Cluster aircraft to reduce computing time.
5. Find the set of maneuvers (one per aircraft) that minimizes the overall cost and
ensures the safety of the airspace.
4.5.1.1 Organization of aircraft by flight level
During the en-route phase of the flight, aircraft maintain constant pressure altitude, cor-
responding to flight levels. Pilots need to obtain a clearance to increase altitude when the
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weight of the aircraft permits. Then, they can climb to the next allowed flight level. During
en-route phases, flight level changes do not occur very often. It is then reasonable to split
the overall airspace into layers corresponding to flight levels. Aircraft can transfer from one
layer to another but the movement of each aircraft between flight level change phases is
considered two-dimensional. When an aircraft is climbing or descending, that is Vzi 6= 0,
the aircraft is accounted for at all the flights levels between the current flight level and the
destination flight level.
4.5.1.2 Determination of feasible maneuvers
To provide controllers with a simple set of avoidance maneuvers, the set M of potential
maneuvers for all the aircraft includes the following: No change, speed changes (±∆V ),
heading changes (±∆ψ) and flight level changes (±∆FL). Only one maneuver per aircraft
is allowed, i.e. an aircraft cannot change heading and change speed concurrently. Let mki be
a binary variable that indicates that aircraft i executes maneuver k, k ∈M. The following
discrete dynamics are used for the aircraft:
Vi(t+ 1) = Vi(t) +m
1
i∆V −m2i∆V, (51)
ψi(t+ 1) = ψi(t) +m
3
i∆ψ −m4i∆ψ, (52)
FLi(t+ 1) = FLi(t) +m
5
i∆FL−m6i∆FL+ 1.Vzi, (53)
where 1.Vzi is the altitude change of aircraft i between t and t+ 1. Maneuvers are assumed
to be immediately executed.
Theoretically, all the aircraft are able to execute all maneuvers in M. In practice, all
maneuvers might not be feasible for each aircraft due to weather, airspace boundary, flight
level change constraints and aircraft performance restrictions. Let Mfeasi be the set of
feasible maneuvers for aircraft i. Mfeasi is a subset ofM and is initially populated with all
the elements of M. The following presents the constraints used to determine maneuvers’
feasibility. If a maneuver is not feasible for aircraft i, it is removed from Mfeasi .
Heading change The constraints accounted for to determine the feasibility of a heading





Figure 38: Weather avoidance constraints
 Weather Avoidance Let tw be the time constant for weather avoidance. A maneuver
is not feasible if, after execution, the new trajectory encounters a weather cell within
a time interval [0 tw]. Severe weather cells are modeled by polyhedral cells in which
aircraft are not allowed to fly. LetW be the set of all severe weather polyhedra wl, l =
1 . . . nw. Weather position and size estimates can be obtained or simulated [117].
To detect whether an aircraft encounters severe weather for t ≤ tw, the position of the
aircraft is extrapolated for different times smaller than tw using the above dynamics. If
the extrapolated position lies within a weather polyhedron wl ∈ W, then the maneuver
is not feasible and it is removed from Mfeasi .
Weather polyhedra are 3-dimensional and do not necessarily cover all flight levels.
They are extrapolated to their convex hull. The example depicted on Figure 38 shows
the reason for dealing with the convex hull instead of the polyhedron itself. The arrows
represent the resulting velocity vectors after execution of maneuvers m1,m2 or m3.
The velocity vectors are scaled so that the arrow heads correspond to the extrapolated
position at time tw. Maneuver m1 corresponds to the nominal trajectory and is not
feasible since it leads the aircraft into the severe weather cell. If m2 were executed,
the aircraft would not encounter weather for t < tw but would then have no choice
but to turn back. This is the reason for extrapolating the weather cell to its convex







Figure 39: Sector boundary constraints
 Airspace Boundary Constraints When proposing a heading change, one needs to
be aware of sector changes. When an aircraft changes sector, the surveillance of the
aircraft is handed out to another controller. If there is a surveillance degradation, this
change might be difficult and should be avoided. Traffic flow management is another
reason to avoid sector changes when trying to solve conflicts. If the neighboring
sector is at maximum capacity, a heading change leading an aircraft to this sector is
not permitted. A heading change leading the aircraft to exit the sector out of the
acceptable exit segment is not allowed. In the situation depicted by Figure 39, m2 is
not permissible since it leads the aircraft to exit the sector out of the allowed segment,
in a time less than a given duration designated by ts. Therefore, any maneuver m
k
i
leading to a premature exit from the sector is removed from Mfeasi .
Speed change Depending on the aircraft’s cruise speed and altitude, accelerating or
deccelerating could bring the aircraft out of its flight envelope [36]. Flying out of the flight
envelope can have dramatic consequences. Therefore, any maneuver mki taking the aircraft
out of its flight envelope will be removed from Mfeasi .
Flight level change Vertical avoidance maneuvers are very efficient: The first effect of
a pitch change is a quick change in vertical speed and therefore altitude [104], but further
throttle adjustments have to be done to maintain the climb rate, altitude and speed. In
addition, the amplitude of required altitude changes for conflict avoidance are relatively
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small (1000 ft) compared to required lateral changes for conflict avoidance (a few NM).
Vertical changes are the maneuvers used by TCAS [139]. This algorithm aims at getting
a sustainable situation after the resolution maneuver. This means it is not only interested
in solving conflicts, but also in ensuring a conflict-free situation for a given period of time.
Therefore, vertical avoidance maneuvers are extended to flight level changes. A flight level
change maneuver mki is removed from M
feas
i if:
 The aircraft is at its service ceiling, that is its weight does not allow it to climb
higher [36].
 Changing flight level might immediately affect traffic on the crossed flight level and
on the targeted flight level.
 The aircraft is descending or it is about to initiate its descent.
4.5.1.3 Degradation modeling and conflict detection
The previous session presented how the the set of all possible maneuversMfeasi for all i ∈ S
is pruned of all the infeasible maneuvers. The model for degradation of performances and
uncertainties presented in section 4.2 is first summarized before determining if a combination
of maneuvers lead to a conflict. The initial radius of avoidance is denoted by r0 and the
final one by rf . The rate of growth of the radius ṙ is assumed constant, i.e. tg =
rf−ri
ṙ ,
where tg is the time of growth of the radius of avoidance. It represents the time allowed
to increase the separation distance between aircraft and is a variable that can be set in the
model. It is assumed that the radius of avoidance has a constant value for t > tg. In this
model, the degradation does not affect aircraft vertical performance, that is, traffic does
not need to be additionally vertically spread out.
Let tc be the time horizon for conflict detection. Allowing only maneuvers that do not
lead to a conflict in the next tc minutes ensures that the airspace will remain conflict-free
for the next tc minutes. To determine if a maneuver leads to a conflict, the existence of a
point of intersection of the circles of avoidance is sought. If it exists, the time to conflict is
calculated. Let Xr and Vr define the relative position and velocity of aircraft j with respect
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Let present first the ondition for conflict existence with final radius of avoidance rf . The
two circles of avoidance will intersect when the distance between the two aircraft is equal
to 2rf :
‖Xr + Vrt‖ = 2rf . (55)
The discriminant of this polynomial in t is
∆ = (2Xr · Vr)2 − 4V 2r (X2r − 4r2f ). (56)
If ∆ ≤ 0, the circles will never intersect or be tangent and there is no conflict. The
corresponding maneuvers do not lead to a conflict and they are a feasible combination of
maneuvers. If ∆ > 0, there are two solutions t1,2 corresponding to the very first time the
circles intersect and to the end of the intersection period. The solutions are
t1,2 =
−2Xr · Vr ±
√
(2Xr · Vr)2 − 4V 2r (X2r − 4r2f )
2V 2r
. (57)
This leads to the following potential cases:
 t1 ≤ t2 ≤ 0: The circles intersected in the past, no conflict.
 t1 ≤ 0 ≤ t2: The circles of radius rf are already intersecting. The time of intersection
for growing the circles needs to be computed. If ‖Xr‖ > 2rf , a sufficient condition
for no conflict is Xr · Vr < 0.
 0 ≤ t1 ≤ tg: The circles of avoidance will intersect before the radii of avoidance reach
rf . The time of intersection of the growing circles needs to be computed.
 0 < tg ≤ t1 < tc: The circles will intersect with radius of avoidance rf , in a time
shorter than tc. This combination of maneuvers is not permitted, since it leads to a
conflict.
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 0 < tc ≤ t1: The circles will intersect in a later time than the time horizon fixed for
conflict detection. This maneuver is feasible.
Note that this requires that ‖Vr‖ 6= 0. If ‖Vr‖ = 0, aircraft have the same heading and the
same speed. A conflict can only occur during the period of growing radii if the distance
between the aircraft is smaller than 2rf .
If t1 ≥ tg, the conflict will happen after the radius of the circles reaches rf . Otherwise,
the same reasoning applies, except that the value of t1 is obtained by solving the following
equation:
‖Xr + Vrt‖ = 2(ri + ṙt), (58)
which has solutions (if any)
t1,2 =
−(Xr · Vr − 8riṙ)
(V 2r − 4ṙ2)
±
√
(Xr · Vr − 4riṙ)2 − 2(V 2r − 4ṙ2)(X2 − 4r2i )
(V 2r − 4ṙ2)
. (59)
If no conflict is detected, let Kklij be a binary variable indicating that aircraft i executes
maneuver mki ∈ M
feas











j , i and j not in conflict
}
. If Kklij = 1,∀k ∈ M
feas
i , l ∈ M
feas
j ,
then aircraft i and j are not in conflict, no matter what combination of maneuvers is
chosen. Aircraft i and j do not interact. Now that feasible maneuvers and conflict-free
combinations of maneuvers have been identified, the following step is a clustering method
based on possible interactions used to reduce the computing load.
4.5.1.4 Aircraft clustering
To optimize the computational performance, aircraft are split into clusters C. Clustering
enables parallel computation. Aircraft are clustered by potential interaction, i.e aircraft i
and j belong to the same cluster if one of the combination of feasible maneuvers of Kij
is executed and leads to a conflict. Algorithm 1 is used to cluster aircraft based on their
possible interaction.
95
Input: Set of n aircraft and no cluster
Output: Set of clusters
foreach aircraft i = 2 to n do
foreach aircraft j = 1 to i− 1 do
if aircraft i and j can be in conflict then
if aircraft j belongs to a cluster Ck then
if aircraft i belongs to a cluster Cl then
merge clusters Ck and Cl;
else
add aircraft i to cluster Ck
end
else
if aircraft i belongs to a cluster Cl then
add aircraft j to cluster Cl
else







Algorithm 1: Clustering algorithm based on possible interaction
4.5.2 MIP formulation
The previous steps provide us with a set of aircraft clusters that can potentially interact,
and a set of feasible maneuvers for each aircraft. The near-optimal set of maneuvers that
spreads out the traffic and avoids conflicts is selected using a mixed integer program solved
with CPLEX [64].
4.5.2.1 Maneuver uniqueness for each aircraft





mki = 1, (60)
for each aircraft i ∈ S.
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4.5.2.2 Avoidance constraint
For any combination of aircraft (i, j) ∈ Cp , Kklij = 1 implies that aircraft i executes maneuver
mki ∈M
feas




j , that is
Kklij =⇒ mki +mlj = 2. (61)
Combining this implication with a uniqueness constraint on the choice of possible maneuvers
for each combination of aircraft ∑
Kklij ∈Kij
Kklij = 1, (62)
ensures that the requirement of only one conflict-free maneuver for each aircraft is met.
4.5.2.3 Maneuver cost
The cost of each maneuver is determined by the speed of its execution and the imminence
of the conflict, since there is a risk of collision when the maneuver is not implemented on
time. For instance, it takes less time to climb several hundred feet than accelerate 20 kts at
constant altitude in cruise. The most efficient maneuver for conflict avoidance is a vertical
change. A heading change is the second fastest maneuver to implement and a speed change
is the slowest. Therefore, the cost c
mki
ij for aircraft i of maneuver m
k
i to resolve the conflict
with aircraft j will depend on the imminence of a conflict if no maneuver is executed, and
if so, on the time to conflict t1, expressed in minutes.
If no conflict : c∆ψ < c∆FL < c∆V ,
if t1 < 2 : c
∆FL < c∆ψ < c∆V ,
if 2 ≤ t1 < 8 : c∆ψ < c∆FL < c∆V ,
if 8 ≤ t1 : c∆V < c∆ψ < c∆FL,
where c∆FL is the cost of a flight level change, c∆ψ the cost of a heading change and c∆V









where Cp is the cluster of aircraft i.
97
4.5.2.4 Objective function
The objective is to minimize the cost J of the selected maneuvers. The algorithm thus
















subject to the avoidance and maneuver uniqueness constraints.
4.5.2.5 Existence of a solution
Given an initial limited set of potential maneuvers Mi for each aircraft i, there might not
exist a solution for all the aircraft. This can be the case if an aircraft that, in addition to
being in conflict with another or several other aircraft, is highly constrained by weather,
sector boundaries, and performance. To resolve this issue, the set of potential maneuvers
for aircraft i and for the aircraft in conflict is extended, i.e a wider range of heading changes
is added. Before choosing the best set of maneuvers, it is checked that there exist several
feasible maneuvers for each aircraft. If not, new maneuvers are added to Mi and the
algorithm is restarted. Even if there exist several feasible maneuvers for each aircraft, there
might not exist a set of maneuvers that satisfy all the constraints, which is immediately
detected by the MIP solver. The same solution applies for this case, i.e increasing the set
of potential maneuvers. This process is iterated until a solution exists.
4.5.3 Simulation results
A 3-dimensional airspace with 7 flight levels (350 to 410) was simulated. The airspace is
a square whose sied is 400 NM. Aircraft fly on distinct flight levels but can change levels
to avoid conflicts. Aircraft fly westbound on even-numbered flight levels and eastbound
on odd-numbered flight levels. The values of the simulation parameters are presented in
Table 4.
Figure 40 presents a screenshot of the airspace during the simulation. The polyhedron in
the middle represents a weather phenomenon that should be avoided. The weather does not
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tc For same flight level: 15 min.
tc When changing flight level: 5 min for flight level crossed.




∆ψ ±20◦ and ±70◦.
∆V −20 kts.
∆FL ±2 flight levels.
cover all the flight levels in this simulation so aircraft can fly over it. There are two aircraft
on the weather cell, but the 3D view indicates that the cyan aircraft is above the weather cell
while the blue aircraft is below the weather cell. Figure 41 displays the number of aircraft in
the airspace and the number of maneuvers executed at each time step. At t = 150 min, the
arrival rate of aircraft in the airspace was increased. Resolution maneuvers are computed
every three minutes and maneuvers are instantaneously executed. The growing radius of
avoidance accounts for a potential delay in the maneuver execution time. As the number
of aircraft in the airspace increases, the number and frequency of maneuvers required also
increases.
MATLAB was used to generate the feasible solutions and cluster the aircraft in the
simulations. The MIP was solved with CPLEX. The overall computation time for one
iteration is approximately one minute, using a standard desktop computer. CPLEX was
running on parallel machines to deal with all the clusters. There were up to 25 clusters.
Each cluster is solved in a few seconds.
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Figure 40: 2D and 3D view of the airspace during simulation
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Figure 41: Number of aircraft and maneuvers.
4.6 Summary
This chapter addresses RQ 3 and RQ 4 for a class of operational degradations resulting
from a failure in the CNS systems [45]. The principle of graceful degradation of air traffic
operations against Communication, Navigation or Surveillance failures is outlined using a
model that increases the required separation distance between aircraft.
Then, this model is used as a probe to compare Miles-In-Trail and Free-Flight approach
scenarios and answer RQ 3, that is “What is the sensitivity of traffic configuration to
potential degradation?”.. It was shown that Free-Flight-like approaches do not degrade
significantly worse than Miles-In-Trail scenarios when facing failures of the CNS system,
when the initial distance between aircraft is slightly larger than the minimum separation
distance. The metric used is purely computer based and does not account for the difficul-
tythat a human operator might encounter with one or the other scenario. Probing traffic
configurations for potential degradation in CNS systems is an important step in assessing
the concepts of operations of NextGen and SESAR.
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In support of this study, a new conflict resolution tool that applies to the transient
conditions encountered during failures of the CNS system was developed. This algorithm
provides near-optimal heading change avoidance maneuvers to increase separation distance
and ensure a conflict-free configuration for a given time horizon. The avoidance maneuvers
consist of heading changes.
Then, a more realistic algorithm of avoidance in the presence of uncertainties is intro-
duced [46]. This algorithm provides simple avoidance maneuvers in 3 dimensions. Starting
with a finite number of possible maneuvers for each aircraft, the set of maneuvers that
ensures a conflict-free airspace is determined. Such a tool could be used as a backup system
for future operations concepts. This centralized algorithm can handle hundreds of aircraft
using clustering and parallel processing. This algorithm answered RQ 4, that is, “How can
the smooth transition from nominal mode of operations to degraded mode of operations
be ensured?” by proposing avoidance maneuvers to ensure a smooth transition from nomi-
nal mode of operation to degraded mode of operation. It was showed that such avoidance
maneuvers can be computed in real time.
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CHAPTER V
MONITORING OPERATIONS FOR POTENTIAL DEGRADATION:
AIRSPACE MONITORING
5.1 Introduction
This chapter addresses RQ 5, that is “It is possible to monitor the airspace for potential
degradations?”. En-route and terminal traffic are studied in two different sections because
of their different nature. During en-route operations, aircraft mostly fly straight legs, with
only a few turns and a few flight level changes. During the terminal phase of the flight,
aircraft trajectories are subject to much more vertical motion and possibly to vectoring.They
may even be asked to fly a holding pattern. The movement of aircraft in terminal areas is
more complex than it is during en-route phases.
This chapter introduces complexity measures for en-route and terminal area traffic.
Airspace complexity has been and is still studied from different standpoints, but rarely
with airspace degradation in mind. Delahaye and Puechmorel present maps using aircraft
configuration based on non-linear dynamical systems [21]. Their measure of Lyapunov
Exponents captures the structure and organization of a traffic situation, by identifying the
organization of trajectories in a traffic pattern. The comparison of the relative complexity of
different regions of the airspace is enabled using such maps. Lee proposed a set a complexity
maps based on input-output approaches [78]. The response of the airspace to a disturbance
is analyzed by measuring the amplitude of traffic deviation that would need to be undergone
by traffic for all instances of an intruder aircraft. Both Delahaye and Lee’s maps are traffic
sensitivity to disturbance measures. Another broadly used approach to evaluate airspace
complexity is to measure controller workload. In ATC, traffic complexity and controller’s
workload are often related [93]. Histon et al. [58, 59, 60] showed that structure and cognitive
complexity are also directly related: controllers are more subject to errors when merging
traffic with different merging points rather than with a unique one. Sridhar and al. [131]
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propose a complexity measure based on dynamic density. Dynamic density is a combination
of variables such as traffic density, number of aircraft with speed changes or number of
aircraft with heading changes. The weights are determined using linear and non linear
regressions from a subjective survey data. Complexity measures can be used for different
purposes. Bilimoria and Jastrzebski proposed an aircraft clustering procedures based on
airspace complexity [8]. Using complexity, separation and stability measures, they can
produce highly complex cluster patterns that are well separated and stable. This complexity
based work can improve operations if the overall ATM systems works in nominal mode.
Yousefi and Donohue [147] propose complexity maps and airspace sectorization based on a
measure of controller’s workload. Dividing the airspace in hexagonal cells, they calculate
the ATC workload for each of them over a day of simulation. Then, the cells are clustered
to construct sectors of limited complexity.
Until this work, the question of airspace degradation had not been addressed in the
literature. It is interesting to note that Delahaye and Puechmorel analyze the complexity
using open-loop measures, while Lee uses closed-loop measures. From a system’s control
standpoint, Lee’s “controllers” are conflict resolution algorithms. The resulting complexity
map depends on the “controller”. As shown in previous studies [90, 89], a traffic situation
can be very difficult to manage by some control strategies and more easily by some others.
The algorithm used and the complexity map generated are highly dependent. In the case
of Workload based complexity maps, the measure is closed-loop. The controller is not
automatic but the Air Traffic Controller. The resulting maps are very subjective as they are
dependent on humans. Many factors affect workload. The same traffic situation presented
to the same controller in different environmental conditions can result in different workloads.
Airspace monitoring has also been the topic of several research papers. Krozel [73] pro-
posed an intent based monitoring where the aircraft is tracked relative to a filed flight plan,
using NavAids and way-points. The monitoring tasks requires knowledge of the airspace
structure, of the trajectory way-points and of the intent of the aircraft. It is a powerful tool
when the flights behave according to their flight plan, but when dealing with arrivals, the
sequence of way-points might change, some might be skipped or added to ensure an optimal
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separation of aircraft at the runway threshold and vectoring is often used. This monitoring
method cannot be used. Reynolds et al. [119] introduced a framework for the development of
an automated conformance monitoring system. The system described in [119] has two main
inputs: the conformance basis, containing target states and trajectory information, and the
observation of a surveillance system. Those inputs feed models for pilots’ intents, aircraft
intents, and aircraft control systems and dynamics. Those models provide an expected state
vector that is compared with the observed state vector for conformance analysis. This struc-
ture is further used in [118] to monitor the conformance of a trajectory to a flight plan. For
instance, it detects if an aircraft does not turn, turns too early or too late at a way-point.
The monitoring is based on intent, and knowledge of the the exact expected trajectory is
required. An off-line trajectory analysis and taxonomy for arrival trajectories is proposed
by Eckstein [26]. The objective of Eckstein is to analyze the performance of area navigation
(RNAV) operations for NextGen concepts of operations off-line. The method in [26] uses
GPS coordinates of actual way-points to identify and classify segments of trajectories. This
approach can be used only if aircraft follow RNAV operations, which is not the case with
the data used.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.2 focuses on en-route
traffic and presents degradation maps that display information related to the degration
complexity of the current traffic configuration. Section 5.3 focuses on terminal areas and
analyzes the conformance of current flights to predetermined typical operations in real time.
Finally, section 5.5 summarizes the results of this chapter.
5.2 En-route monitoring for CNS degradation
5.2.1 Degradation evaluator
A first step towards monitoring the en-route airspace for possible degradation of CNS
systems is presented. When monitoring a system for conflicts, one considers the traffic
and nominal behavior, together with nominal Communication, Navigation and Surveillance
(CNS) infrastructure to predict the occurrence of future conflicts among aircraft. When
monitoring system safety against possible degradations, one is concerned not only with
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nominal, but also off-nominal behaviors triggered by these degradations. It is the response
of the airspace to these classes of perturbations that allows us evaluate whether the airspace
configuration under consideration is safe or not. “System response” includes not only the
required control activity (required aircraft deviation from nominal flight path), but also in
terms of the workload imposed on the air traffic controller (in terms, for example, of the
number of conflicts to solve, and the number of utterances required for the controller to
transmit the corresponding advisories to send to all aircraft). Figure 42 presents the en-
Figure 42: Degradation evaluator in the ATM environment
visionned air traffic health monitoring architecture. The main components of this airspace
health monitoring system are a traffic predictor and a degradation evaluator. The traffic
predictor plays an important role in monitoring the airspace, but is not the object of this
thesis. It should propagate the traffic state forward in time. This state propagation effort
would be supported by the current airspace state, together with intent information (flight
plans or related quantities such as waypoints), current and future traffic flows out of airports
as well as exogenous factors such as weather.
The degradation evaluator is a tool whose inputs are the current traffic situation, the
predictions from the traffic predictor and information about exogenous factors, such as
weather. Its aim is to provide controllers and traffic flow manager with information regard-


























Figure 43: Open- and closed-loop information during a degradation of CNS conditions
be obtained using the results from Chapter 4, and for terminal areas, the optimal number
of aircraft was determined in Chapter 3. Feeding back a degradation analysis to air traffic
management would appropriately steer traffic away from sensitive situations.
To measure the ability of a traffic situation to “gracefully” degrade, this chapter in-
troduces a new complexity measure based on degradation performances of a known traffic
pattern. This complexity measure can be summarized in a map that are called “Dynamic
degradation map”. The novelty of this degradation maps is the mix of open-loop and
closed-loop information as well as the focus on degradation perspective. Degradation maps
are introduced to enable an airspace monitoring function. They are “Dynamic Degradation
Maps” for the following reasons: They are dynamic as they evaluate a traffic configuration
at a given time and can be frequently updated. They focus on the degradation of CNS
performance. The smooth transition from nominal to degraded operations is handled by a
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slightly modified version of the algorithm previously presented in section 4.4. Since the focus
is on degradation, the initial configuration is conflict free, so that nominal conflict resolu-
tion activity does not interfere with the measure. The degraded operations considered here
are more conservative than nominal operations since separation distances are increased. In
case of a system failure or a CNS degradation, the traffic needs to be steered from nominal
operations to degraded operations. Due to the degradation and the separation distance in-
crease, new potential conflicts might appear. Degradation modelling and potential conflict
detection are presented in section 4.2. A custom-built solver for degraded conditions conflict
solver can be used to steer the system to safe degraded operations. Figure 43 summarizes
these concepts.
This work deals with complexity from a system’s control standpoint. The considered
system is a traffic situation which states are aircraft’s heading and position. The system is
subject to constraints, such as separation distance. To enforce these separation distances, a
control activity is required. Therefore, two important types of information appear, Open-
and closed-loop information:
 Open-loop information: It is information obtained from the system without using
a controller. In this case, it includes potential conflicts, their location, and involved
aircraft.
 Closed-loop information: It is information provided by the control activity. It in-
cludes heading or speed changes, number of maneuvers. While open-loop information
provides information about what would happen, closed-loop information provides a
measure of the severity of the situation and the difficulty to handle it.
Open-loop information can be gathered from the degraded situation: new potential con-
flicts location, time, distance to aircraft and involved aircraft. The conflict solver provides
closed-loop information to measure the severity of the situation. These informations are
heading changes required or number of maneuvers.
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5.2.2 Characterization of the degradation complexity
The degradation complexity comes from conflicts araising due to the increase of separation
distances. To characterize this complexity, different methods and symbologes - shapes,
opacity and colors - are used to represent the different kinds of available information.
Figure 44(a) presents a small section of the display of a potential conflict on a dynamic
degradation map. The term “potential conflict” is used since the aircraft are conflict free
in nominal conditions, i.e the two circles of avoidance of radius r0 will never intersect.
Figure 44 presents two cases of aircraft in conflict. Figure 44(a) and 44(b) presents two
(a) Simple potential conflict (b) Aircraft involved in two potential con-
flicts
Figure 44: Display of potential conflicts for a dynamic degradation map
and three aircraft in potential conflict, respectively. Aircraft are located at the center of
the colored circles. The black line is the aircraft velocity vector. The tip points at the
position projected three minutes in the future. The circles have a radius r0 = 2.5 NM,
which ensures a 5NM separation distance. Numeration on Figure 44(a) corresponds to the
following information:
Open-loop information:
 Degradation Modeling The model used is a degradation in CNS system as pre-
sented in Chapter 4, section 4.2.
 Shape of the potential conflict area (3): The darkened blue area corresponds
the potential conflict area, defined by the convex hull of the circles of avoidance at
the beginning of the potential conflict and at its end. Let define by beginning of the
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potential conflict the time t1 when the growing circles of avoidance would intersect
for the first time if no action is taken. Let define by end of potential conflict the time
t2 when the growing circles of avoidance would stop interecting if no action is taken.
Long shape indicates a small relative velocity Vij . Vij = 0 will lead to a shape that is
not closed. Figure 45 presents the potential conflicts areas in the case of a low and a
high relative velocity.
(a) Potential conflict with low relative ve-
locity
(b) Potential conflict with high relative ve-
locity
Figure 45: Potential conflict areas
 Opacity of of the potential conflict area (3): It is inversely proportional to the
time to conflict. A very transparent blue area means that the potential conflict is far
in the future. An opaque blue indicates that the potential conflict will occur in a near
future.
 Conflict location (4) and (5): The conflict location is represented by a dark blue
dot (4) and the end of conflict point by a cyan dot (5). The length between these
points gives an indication on the conflict duration. If they are at the same location,
it means that the circles of avoidance are tangent.
 Color of the line joining the aircraft to the conflict location (6): The color
of the line joining the aircraft to the conflict location changes over time, varying from
green for a long-term conflict to red for a short-term conflict. It helps identifying
aircraft involved in a potential conflict and the time remaining to address the threat.
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∆ψi −30◦ −30◦ −30◦ 0◦ 0◦ 0◦ 30◦ 30◦ 30◦
∆ψj −30◦ 0◦ 30◦ −30◦ 0◦ 30◦ −30◦ 0◦ 30◦
 Clusters: Clustering is a commonly used tool in airspace complexity. Aircraft are
clustered, based on possible avoidance maneuvers for all aircraft. A cluster defines
a group of aircraft that can possibly be in conflict or interfere within a given time
horizon, considering limited maneuvers for each aircraft. The time horizon is set to
15 minutes and the range of allowed maneuvers varies from −30◦ to 30◦. Assume
that aircraft i and j can change heading independently, and by no more than 30◦
in amplitude: If such a maneuver can lead to a potential conflict considering final
radii of avoidance rf for each aircraft, then they belong to the same cluster. Clusters
can be merged using the rule that an aircraft cannot belong to two different clus-
ters. Therefore, two aircraft that might not have any direct interaction can be in the
same cluster. Algorithm 1 in section 4.5.1.4 is used to create the clusters of aircraft.
Figure 46 presents the method used to determine if two aircraft belong to the same
cluster. There are two aircraft in the relative axis, i.e aircraft j does not move in
these axis. Let denote by P kij the possible relative positions of aircraft i with respect
to aircraft j after 15 minutes. P kij are calculated for all the combinations of heading
changes ∆ψi and ∆ψj , as presented in table 5. The yellow shaded area is the convex
hull of the circles of radius rf centered on the P
k
ij and on the initial position of aircraft
i. Aircraft i and j belong to the same cluster if the intersection of the yellow shaded
area and a circle of radius rf centered on the initial position of aircraft j is not empty.
On the dynamic degradation maps, the yellow shaded areas represent the clusters, or
more exactly the convex hull of circles of avoidance of the cluster’s aircraft with final
radii of avoidance rf . Note that some aircraft might appear in the yellow area and
not belong to the cluster.
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Figure 46: Possible relative position of two aircraft after a maneuver < 30◦
Clusters are important to evaluate the difficulty to handle the traffic configuration:
they determine the groups of aircraft that might interfere with each other, hence the
constraints to be taken into account for separation purposes. A small cluster is easier
to handle than a larger one. Considering n aircraft, the bigger the clusters, the higher
the difficulty to handle the traffic configuration since more aircraft have to be taken
into account at the same time. It is more difficult to solve an avoidance problem
with many constraints than with no or few. On the maps, aircraft not belonging to a
cluster lower the complexity as they don’t require surveillance or control activity for
the next 15 minutes. This approach to building clusters is different from Bilimoria and
Jastrzebski’s [8]. Aircraft are clustered using geometrical methods and the complexity
is then measured, while Bilimoria and Jastrzebski first measure complexity and cluster
aircraft from it.
Clusters also have an impact on the algorithm the algorithm is run separately for each
cluster.
Closed-loop information:
 Proposed solution (7): The dynamic map proposes a solution made of heading
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change instructions. The proposed solutions is provided by the conflict resolution algo-
rithm under uncertainties presented in section 4.4. The algoritm was slightly modified
to fit the needs of dynamic degradation maps: First, each proposed heading change
∆ψi is discretized such that ∆ψi = ±0◦, 5◦, 10◦ . . . 30◦. Second, the clusters are com-
puted. The presence of the clusters allows the algorithm to remove all the avoidance
constraints between aircraft not belonging to the same cluster. Both changes have a
beneficial effect on the computational time. It can be reduced by a factor up to 100.
 Colors of aircraft (1) & (2): The aircraft color is coded to reflect the amplitude
of the maneuver required to ensure safe separation under degraded conditions. The
colors correspond to the following heading change: green = 0◦, yellow = ±5◦, orange
= ±10◦, red = ±15◦, purple = ±20◦, black ≥ ±25◦. In the example of Figure 44(a),
aircraft (1) should turn left 5◦ and aircraft (2) turn right 15◦.
After all the open- and closed-loop measures have be presented, a map of an ARTCC
can be drawn.
5.2.3 Example of a dynamic degradation map for a center
Figure 47 presents the screenshot of a dynamic map for Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control
Center (ZOB). The following explains the numbered items on Figure 47.
1. Sector (1): The map is presented for one flight level for eastBound traffic. The
configuration contains 27 aircraft. The speed of all aircraft is 400kts.
2. Clusters (2): 5 clusters have been identified by the clustering method. There are
also several isolated aircraft that do not belong to any cluster, because they cannot
interact with any other aircraft. It is low complexity aircraft.
3. Conflicts (3): Three aircraft are in potential conflict. The proposed solutions
consists on deviating two aircraft by 10◦ to the right for the first one and 15◦ to the
right for the second one. The difference in opacity of the blue is slight indicating that
potential conflict will happen almost at the same time.
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Figure 47: Example of dynamic degradation map
4. Conflicts (4a) and (4b) : The shape of the blue area indicates a low relative
velocity in for conflict (4a) and a high relative velocity for conflict (4b).
5. Conflict (6): Aircraft (6a) and (6b) are in potential conflict. A solution to solve
this potential conflict is for aircraft (6b) to turn right by 10◦. The conflict area is
located at (6c) and is barely visible as the conflict would occur in a quite long time.
There is no line joining the aircraft to the conflict indicating that the conflict would
occur in more than 20 minutes. Aircraft (6a) and (6b) are in the same cluster not
because there is a potential conflict in more than 20 minutes, but because a heading
change of 30◦ could lead them to a conflict with each other or with another aircraft
of the cluster in less than 15 minutes.
6. Aircraft (7) does not belong to any cluster. If a degradation happens, there is no
need for particular surveillance.
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5.3 Airspace monitoring for terminal areas
In the previous sections, airspace monitoring for en-route traffic was enabled by dynamic
degradation maps that propose avoidance maneuver to increase required separation dis-
tances between aircraft and provide controllers with a conflict-free configuration. Such
maps cannot be applied to terminal areas traffic because of the nature of the trajectories.
Aircraft do not fly straight path and the intent is to land or depart from airports. This
section proposes an airspace monitoring technique for terminal areas traffic. It monitors
the conformance of current flight path to typical operations for the considered terminal
area. The degradation considered in this section is a deficiency of aircraft and pilots to
follow typical operations. A monitoring tool that automatically detects when an aircraft is
not conforming to typical operations is presented. Typical operations are determined using
trajectory clustering methods presented in Appendix A. The objective of the monitoring
task is to detect when an aircraft deviates from typical path in real time. In appendix A,
typical operations are identified using trajectory clustering. That is, all similar trajectories
are grouped together and “abnormal” trajectories are identified as outliers. For each clus-
ter, the center of mass of all the trajectories of this cluster can be computed and is called
centroid. The centroid can be seen as a typical operation with some variation around it to
account for all the other trajectories of the cluster.
Chapter 3 focuses on minimizing the congestion of the TRACON and determines an
optimal capacity. In this chapter, the focus is on identifying aircraft with a “abnormal”
behaviors, which might result from a congested airspace. In Chapter 3, the TRACON is
seen as a black box and the sequence of incoming aircraft is adjusted to optimize runway
throughput and reduce congestion. This chapter “opens” the black box and looks at the tra-
jectories of the aircraft inside the TRACON. The inputs to this analysis are the trajectories
of the aircraft inside the TRACON.
5.3.1 Motivation for using data-driven methods
As presented in the introduction of this chapter, flight conformance monitoring tools have
already been studied and developed. This chapter presents novel tools because the existings
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tools cannot be applied in terminal areas. Figure 48 displays an satellite view of the San
Francisco Bay Area. The blue circle represents the outer boundary of the TRACON, given
by the area covered by the radar. The white lines are the centroids identified in Appendix
A.5.4. The yellow dots are way-points or reporting points. The locations of those points
come from Standard Terminal Arrival Routes (STAR) and track logs [41]. The centroids
of the clusters pass over only a limited number of way-points. This shows that using
published way-points and reporting points cannot be efficiently used to monitor traffic in
the TRACON. Likewise, the intent based methods cannot be used in the terminal area,
because aircraft and pilots follow the orders of air traffic controllers and not waypoints.
This arrival procedure has not been identified by the clustering algorithm because of the
relatively small number of aircraft using this route, and of the variability of the flight path
following this procedure. During a visit at the Northern California TRACON, the controllers
and managers confirmed that aircraft are not directed by waypoints or reporting points, but














Figure 48: Centroids of the clusters and reporting points/way-points for SFO arrivals.
Those centroids differ from the ones in Figure 61 because the algorithm was run with
different parameters with a smaller sensitivity.
a real-time trajectory analysis tool built upon the knowledge gathered from the clustering
analysis. The tool is called AirTrajectoryMiner (ATM) since it enables the monitoring of
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operations in the TRACON. Current aircraft trajectories are compared against nominal
trajectories, that is, the trajectories of the cluster of interest. If they differ too much,
the current trajectory is tagged as abnormal, or outlier. The only intent used is the final
destination airport for each aircraft. The tool automatically detects if the aircraft is flying
one of the possible approaches, including most commonly used vectoring maneuvers.
5.3.2 Data formatting
It is not possible to directly compare the current trajectories with nominal trajectories,
since current trajectories are incomplete. During real-time system operations, only past
data is known. Therefore, the nominal dataset is fragmented. Re-sampled trajectories that
had 50 points (see Appendix A) are split in 10 fragments of 5 points. The average travel
time in the TRACON for aircraft landing at SFO is about 14 minutes. Therefore, 5 data
points correspond to about 14 × 60/10 = 84 seconds. A memory of 80 seconds is used for
current tracks. The radar hits of the last 80 seconds of flight are re-sampled to 5 points
that can now be compared against the database of nominal tracks. This comparison is done
using the Inductive Monitoring System.
5.3.3 Anomaly detection: Inductive Monitoring System
To detect abnormal trajectories, the Inductive Monitoring System (IMS) [68] is used. IMS
is a good alternative to model based health monitoring systems. It provides a high fidelity
detection tool, and there is no need to manually build a model. IMS runs in two steps: a
learning phase followed by an anomaly detection phase. IMS learns the nominal behaviors
using a training dataset provided by the user. IMS builds clusters using k-means clustering
and density-based clustering [68]. During the anomaly detection phase, the input data is
compared with the knowledge base built from the training data. The anomaly score can be
interpreted as the distance to the nearest cluster. The input data belongs to a cluster if all
the parameters values are within the range specified by the cluster limits.
The training dataset includes all the trajectories identified as nominal and fragmented
into 10 segments of 5 points. The total number of segments was 276,040.
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5.3.4 AirTrajectoryMiner: monitoring tool
AirTrajectoryMiner is a real time TRACON monitoring tool. The inputs to the tool are
the set of all the trajectories identified as nominal, work resulting from Appendix A.5.4,
and the radar tracks of the flights of interest. AirTrajectoryMiner delivers two types of
outputs. On the one hand, it delivers an indication of conformance of current flight to
nominal procedures, and on the other hand, it delivers a measure of the complexity in the
TRACON that can be incorporated in Traffic Management Advisor (TMA) software.
Figure 49: AirTrajectoryMiner display. Top frame: conformance to typical operations.
Bottom frame: time history of complexity in the TRACON.
Figure 49 displays the monitoring environment. The top frame is a 2D view of the
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airspace. The airspace correspongs to a cylinder of radius 80km, going from the ground
up to 6,000 m and centered at OAK. The representation is in 2D but the track analysis
considers the 3 dimensions of the tracks. The following provides some information about
the display and associated aircraft count.
 Green circle: aircraft intended to land at SFO (associated count: nSFO).
 Grey square: aircraft not intended to land at SFO (associated count: nSFO).
 Green segment: trajectory of an aircraft intended to land at SFO and following the
procedures (associated count: nOK,SFO).
 Red segment: trajectory of an aircraft intended to land at SFO and whose trajectory
is identified as an outlier: it does not to follow the procedures (associated count:
nOK,SFO).
 Grey segment: trajectory of an aircraft not intended to land at SFO and whose
trajectory does not interfere with traffic landing at SFO nOK,SFO).
 Orange segment: trajectory of an aircraft not intended to land at SFO and whose
trajectory may interfere with traffic intended to land at SFO. IMS identified the tra-
jectory as nominal for landing at SFO, but the flight is not inbound to SFO (associated
count: nOK,SFO).
 Colored lines: Centroids of the clusters of trajectories identified as nominal. The
centroids differ from the ones on Figure 61, because the clustering algorithm was re-
run with different parameters allowing more variability in the clusters and therefore
creating fewer clusters.
Aircraft intent information, i.e the destination airport, comes from the data. The length
of the line following the aircraft corresponds to the part of the trajectory being analyzed,
that is the last 80 seconds of the trajectory. The length of the line is therefore proportional to
the velocity of the aircraft. This display is intended for an air traffic controller managing the
arrivals at SFO. A similar display would be used for managing other arrivals or departures
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for San Jose International Airport or Oakland International Airport. The only change would
be the training data for IMS and the centroids displayed. Aircraft with a gray segment can
be ignored, since they are not landing at SFO and are not interfering with landing traffic
at SFO. Aircraft with a green segment are following the typical operations to land at SFO.
Aircraft in orange require special attention since they are not intended to land at SFO but
present characteristics that identify them as “in the pattern to land at SFO”. They conform
with some of the SFO landing trajectories. Aircraft in red also need special attention since
they are supposed to land at SFO but currently not on typical tracks. The controller needs
to make sure they are not generating conflicts or interfering with other traffic.
5.3.5 AirTrajectoryMiner: measure of complexity
Based on the compliance of current flights to procedures, this section defines a measure
of complexity for the TRACON, which could provide an automatic feedback of the health
of the TRACON to the traffic flow manager who regulates the flow of aircraft arriving
in the TRACON. This complexity measure is directly linked to the analysis performed
in Chapter 3. High complexity aircraft have trajectories that were named “rerouted” in
Chapter 3. The optimization of section 3.5 determines a TRACON capacity to limit the
number of such trajectories. According to [59, 92], controllers build a mental model of
nominal operations. The complexity of a traffic configuration perceived by the controllers
increases when an aircraft flight paths do not follow this mental model. When operations are
running as expected, the controller is more efficient and can deal with more aircraft. Thus,
increasing the number of aircraft not following nominal procedure reduces the maximum
number of aircraft a controller can deal with simultaneously, reducing the capacity of the
airspace. During a visit of the Northern California TRACON, the parameters that were
identified as important to evaluate complexity are vectoring, aircraft on holding patterns,
aircraft mix, i.e turboprops and jets at the same time, and aircraft types (e.g heavy, medium,
light). The proposed monitoring tool identifies aircraft that are subject to large vectors,
those flying on holding patterns and those executing a go-around as outliers. Turboprops,
which increase controller’s workload, are also likely to be identified as outliers since they fly
120
on dedicated routes that were not identified as typical by the presented clustering algorithm.
In future work, those flights can be treated separately using the metadata to create clusters
of turboprops only.
The proposed complexity measure is based on Shannon’s theory of communication [127].
Let SSFO be the sample space of all the aircraft inbound for SFO, in the TRACON at a
given time. The random variable X defined on SSFO assigns OK to the aircraft identified
as nominal and OKi, i = 1 . . . nOK,SFO to the aircraft identified as outliers. For the aircraft
identified as outliers, it is assumed that each outlier aircraft is unique and independent from
other aircraft. At each instant, each outlier is considered different from the other outliers,
that is there are nOK,SFO types of outliers. The resulting probability mass function fX(x)
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The entropy HSFO of the aircraft inbound to SFO is therefore
































The proposed measure of complexity C is the sum of the entropy of aircraft inbound to
SFO and the entropy of aircraft not inbound to SFO
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C = HSFO +HSFO. (70)
This complexity measure is an indication of the disorder with regard to nominal opera-
tions. If no aircraft is identified as an outlier, the complexity is 0. The complexity increases
with the number of outliers detected, but also with the number of aircraft. The bottom
left plot of Figure 49 shows this measure of the complexity over the last 10 minutes. The
plot is refreshed every 15 seconds. When the traffic flow manager sees that the complexity
increases, ATM provides information about the operations in the TRACON. If the com-
plexity gets high, the controller in charge of the TRACON is likely to have a high workload.
Providing the traffic flow manager with this complexity measure can help him manage the
flow of arriving aircraft. A low complexity suggests that more aircraft can be allowed in the
TRACON. Increasing complexity suggests that the TRACON controllers are subject to an
heavy workload and that the aircraft arrival rate should be reduced.
5.4 Envisioned incorporation of the monitoring tools in the ATMS
Figure 50 shows how the Degradation Evaluator presented in section 5.2 and AirTrajec-
toryMiner presented in section 5.3 could be incorporated into the air traffic management
environment.
From an ATM perspective, aircraft can be split in three categories: aircraft flying in
terminal areas, aircraft in en-route phase, and aircraft not flying yet, but scheduled to,
and represented as flight plans. All those aircraft are located and surveilled by surveillance
systems such as secondary radars, ADS-B, etc. Those surveillance systems feed ATCs and
TFMs softwares and displays. Using this information, ATCs close the loop by directing
aircraft. TFMs act on flight plans to delay or reroute aircraft. TFMs are helped by the
TMA [97]. The degradation evaluator introduced in section 5.2.1 can be used by controllers
in ARTCCs as shown in Figure 50. The inputs to the degradation evaluator come from
the surveillance systems, which feed the algorithm of avoidance under uncertainties. Those
avoidance maneuvers are incorporated in the degradation evaluator to generate degradation





































Figure 50: Schematic view of the air traffic control system - Integration of AirTrajecto-
ryMiner and of the degradation maps
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and controllers in TRACONs. Historical data from the surveillance systems can be used
for learning typical operations and built a set of nominal trajectories. Then, in real time,
flight tracks information from the same surveillance systems can be compared to the set of
nominal trajectories to determine is the aircraft conforms to it. If not, this information is
provided to the TRACON ATCs, and increases the value of the complexity that is fed to
the TFMs. AirTrajectoryMiner can be used as an automatic independent monitoring tool.
5.5 Summary
This chapter adresses RQ 5, that is “Is it possible to monitor operations for potential degra-
dations?”. The question was answered by introducing two tools for airspace monitoring.
The first tool entitled degradation evaluator measures the ability of current traffic con-
figuration to degrade in the event of a degradation of the CNS systems [47]. The mitigation
action is an increase in the separation distance between aircraft. The degradation complex-
ity associated with a traffic configuration is displayed using degradation maps that could
be used by air traffic controllers in the event of a degradation. The maps provide a set of
simple avoidance maneuvers that should be executed by the aircraft in order to maintain a
conflict free situation. For instance, such maps could be available in each ARTCC for the
other ARTCC in the event of the complete failure of one of them. Assume that ARTCC
A completely fails. ARTCC B could use the map to direct aircraft previously controlled
by ARTCC A. By spreading out traffic, controllers from ARTCC B would have time to
manage aircraft from ARTCC A and ARTCC A would have some time to recover.
The second tool presented in this chapter focuses on monitoring the conformance of
current flight tracks to pre-established typical operations [48]. The degradation monitored
is a deficiency of aircraft to follow typical operations. Typical operations are learned from
historical data and by using the trajectory clustering algorithm of appendix A. The moni-
toring tool AirTrajectoryMiner determines in real time if aircraft are conforming to typical
operations. In addition, it provides a complexity measure that reflects the disorder in the
terminal area. This information can be used by traffic flow managers to reduce the flow of
incoming aircraft when the complexity is high. AirTrajectoryMiner could also be used by
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air traffic controllers to help them focusing on aircraft with a higher complexity. This tool






Current Air Traffic Management Systems (ATMS) are aging and the introduction and use
of new technologies is a prerequisite to achieving the level of traffic expected for the decades
to come. Since the successful implementation of the concepts of operations described by
NextGen and SESAR rely on highly automated systems, the new technologies need to
coexist with the existing systems during technology modernization. In the event of a partial
or total failure or a degradation of the automation, the safety of the airspace should not
be jeopardized. This thesis addresses the problem of the degradation of such systems, i.e
answering the questions: “What if a failure occurs in the ATMS? Is it possible to ensure the
safety of the airspace?” To answer these broad questions, this thesis proposed 6 research
questions (RQ 0-5). Each chapter addresses one or several of thoses questions.
The research questions address the main topic of this thesis, “Graceful Degradation of
ATMS”. The process of a safe degradation of performances in the event of a failure in the
ATMS is defined by graceful degradation. A graceful degradation occurs when the transition
from nominal mode of operations to degraded mode of operations is smooth and with no
catastrophic event. It is now possible to proceed with the conclusions of this thesis.
The fundamental research question, RQ 0 for this work is addressed in the introduction
by providing a list of failures that can affect the ATMS. Since the ATMS is a broadly
distributed and heterogeneous system, it was decided that an exhaustive list was not the
best solution. To be accurate, this list should be updated constantly to be current. The
proposed list focuses on the main categories of failures and degradation that can affect
the ATMS. To deal with the failures in a systematic way, an ontology of the ATMS is
presented in Chapter 2. This ontology provides answers to RQ 1 and 2, by enabling the
propagation and tracking of failures throughout the ATMS. As the failure propagates along
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the link structure of the model, functionalities of pieces of equipments or people are disabled.
Therefore, the execution of some tasks and eventually operations is not feasible anymore.
The ontology propagates the failure and the resulting loss of capabilities is instantaneously
known. The ontology provides the chain of events that result from a failure and its impact
on operations.
Chapter 3 provides answers to RQ 3 and RQ 4 for a particular operational degradation,
which is a reduction of landing capacity at SFO. The loss of capacity can be due to the late
fog dissipation. An input-output queuing model for the NCT TRACON was developed,
calibrated and validated using historical data. The model closely reproduces the behavior
of SFO landing capacity when facing runway closures. The sensitivity of different queuing
policies was analyzed using the model, in order to determine the optimal TRACON capacity
that minimizes delays and congestions on one the one hand, and ensures a maximum runway
throughput on the other hand.
Chapter 4 provides answers to RQ 3 and RQ 4 for another particular type of operational
degradation: The degradation of Communication, Navigation and Surveillance systems. A
conservative model for CNS degradation is developed. It accounts for a wide range of degra-
dations, from a minor navigation degradation, to a surveillance failure. A degradation in
navigation capabilities would cause aircraft to follow less accurately the intended trajectory,
resulting in a reduction of the predictability from the controller’s view point. A degradation
in surveillance would result in the controller knowing with less accuracy the actual position
of the aircraft. In both cases, the uncertainty on the aircraft position increases. Therefore,
the model proposes the increase of separation distance between aircraft. This thesis pro-
poses two algorithmic solutions to solve this new problem of avoidance under uncertainties.
First, a near-optimal algorithm of avoidance in the presence of uncertainties is developed
and is solved using Mixed Integer Programming. The outputs of the algorithm are the mini-
mum heading changes required to provide a conflict free solution when the distance between
aircraft must be increased. This algorithm is used as a probe to analyze the sensitivity of
two types of operations to CNS degradation: Free-Flight like arrivals and Miles-In-Trail
like arrivals. The conclusion is that Free Flight does not appear to be significantly more
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problematic from the standpoint of CNS degradation. The comparison measure is the total
heading change required to always ensure a safe separation between aircraft when radii of
avoidance increase. This degradation measure does not reflect the issues related with the
difficulties a human controller might have handling the less organized traffic arising from
Free-Flight operations. The second implementation presented is an algorithm of avoidance
in the presence of uncertainties, in 3 dimensions. The algorithm differs from the previous
one as it determines a set of simple avoidance maneuvers for each aircraft, from a prede-
termined pool of possible solutions. The resulting traffic configuration is conflict free for a
given period of time that allows controllers to recover from the failure. The avoidance ma-
neuvers account for sector boundaries, aircraft performances and weather. The problem is
also solved using Mixed Integer Programming. This algorithm provides solutions to ensure
the smooth transition from nominal mode of operations to degraded mode of operations,
by means of avoidance maneuvers.
Chapter 5 focuses on the monitoring of operations and answers RQ 5. For en-route
traffic, the degradation of interest is a failure in the CNS systems. A monitoring environment
using degradation maps is presented. Degradation maps present a simple and efficient way to
visualize the complexity of a traffic configuration to gracefully degrade. Using a set of colors
and shapes, the maps display open- and closed-loop information. Open-loop information
include clusters of aircraft that should be dealt with together and potential conflicts resulting
of the increase in separation distances. Closed-loop information include quantized heading
changes. For terminal areas, the degradation of interest is a deficiency of aircraft to follow
typical operations. A real-time conformance monitoring tool is developed. The tool analyzes
the conformance of current flight paths to pre-identified typical operations. Due to the
nature of traffic in terminal areas, monitoring conformance using published waypoints and
reporting points is not possible. Typical operations were learned using trajectory clustering
methods run on month of traffic data in the NCT.
Appendix A presents two trajectory clustering methods. The first method is based on
the identification and grouping of turning points in the trajectories into waypoints. Then,
trajectories going through the same waypoints are clustered using the longest common
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subsequence of waypoints. The second method is based on a principal components analysis
of the resampled and augmented trajectories. First, the trajectories are resampled to have
the same number of data points. Then, some dimensions are added by computing extra
parameters like the heading, from the initial data. After running a principal components
analysis on this set of trajectories, the projections of the trajectories onto the first 5 principal
components are clusters using DBSCAN, a density based clustering algorithm. The results
of this methods are visually good. There exists no objective metric to validate those results.
If such a metric existed, it would be used to optimize the clustering results.
6.2 Future work
To make a full use of the ontology proposed in Chapter 2, a shared, a web-based implemen-
tation might be necessary. Since not everyone is an expert on the entire system, each expert
could contribute their local knowledge to the ontology. Then, it would be easy to add a new
block that represent a new technology, task or concept of operation. By introducing failures
at different levels, the robustness of the new ConOps can be evaluated. A collaboration
with experts from different fields in the ATMS is necessary to ensure a useful model.
The safe degradation process in terminal areas is still a research problem. An important
question is “Is it possible to design a system such that, in the event of a TRACON ground
control failure, all aircraft can land safely and in a timely manner using self-separation”. For
en-route, such a problem is called Free-Flight and is the topic of several research programs.
It is also under practice and study above the Mediterranean region [33]. The problem is
more complex for the terminal area. The idea is to have aircraft with no outside visibility
fly VFR operations. With the advances of ADS-B, pilot’s awareness of surrounding aircraft





This appendix presents two methods to cluster trajectories and identify flights that fol-
loweidentical air routes. The first method is based on the identification of way-points in
the trajectories, and the second method is based on a principal components analysis of
re-sampled trajectories. Operations in the terminal area are managed by ATCs and are not
part of the flight plans. It was therefore decided not to use any flight plan knowledge or
aircraft intent other than the destination airport. The methods developed in this appendix
are neither location nor data specific and can easily be adapted to other data sets since
unsupervised methods are used, and the data is not labeled. This appendix considers radar
tracks in the NCT. However, the underlying principles may also be used for other appli-
cations, such a flow reconstruction for en route airspace [85, 121]. The use of positioning
devices such as GPS and the collection of data has increased over the past 15 years, leading
to an increasing number of tracking applications. An objective of tracking is to discover
common patterns on the one hand, and detect outliers on the other hand.
Piciareli et al. [106] presented an on-line trajectory clustering method for real time video
surveillance. Moving objects, such as pedestrians, are identified in video frames and their
trajectories are compared against existing cluster representatives, that is, an average of all
the trajectories in the cluster. The match between a trajectory and a cluster is determined
using the mean of the normalized distances of every trajectory point to the nearest point
of the cluster representative. If a match is found, the cluster representative is updated.
If not, a new cluster is created. In this approach, the cluster representatives evolve with
time. This clustering method was used by Dahlbom and Niklasson for coastal surveillance
but failed to provide satisfactory results when dealing with real data sets [17] such as ship
trajectories.
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Lee et al. [77] presented a partition-and-group framework for trajectory clustering. Tra-
jectories are partitioned in sub-trajectories. Sub-trajectories are represented by line seg-
ments and grouped using a distance function. The distance function incorporates three
components that measure the perpendicular distance, the parallel distance and the angular
distance between the line segments. The clustering algorithm is density based, i.e clusters
are created where the density of points is highest. The formulation is powerful but the
results are presented on very noisy data where it is difficult to visually cluster the trajec-
tories. There exists no well-defined measure to assess the results of the clustering method.
Based on the same distance measure, Lee et al. [76] present a trajectory outliers detection
procedure. The results are presented on the same noisy datasets and are therefore difficult
to evaluate visually.
Vlachos et al. used similarity functions based on the longest common subsequence (LCS)
to discover similar multidimensional trajectories [141]. Their LCS based clustering method
appears to be more efficient than Euclidean distance based measures and dynamic time
warping distance functions, especially in the presence of noise.
Eckstein proposed an automated flight track taxonomy [26] . The trajectories are first re-
sampled, then clustered using k-means on a reduced order model. The model reduction is the
truncation of a proper orthogonal decomposition (POD) , also called principal components
analysis. The trajectories are clustered using only the first two modes of the decomposition,
as they capture 95% of the fluctuations of the dataset used.
The first section presents the data set used for the study. The second section presents
the waypoint based methods and the third section presents the principal components based
method.
A.2 Available data
The available data 1 consists of records of flight tracks over the San Francisco bay area,
for the first 3 months of 2006. The records cover NCT, that is, a cylinder of radius 80km
and height 6,000m centered on Oakland International Airport (OAK). The NCT contains
1The complete dataset is available for download https://dashlink.arc.nasa.gov/data/
flight-tracks-northern-california-tracon/
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3 main airports  Oakland, San Francisco (SFO) and San Jose International airports  as
well as many smaller airports. The NCT is the fourth busiest terminal area in the US [37]
with an average of 133,000 flight instrument operations per month in 2006. The data, made
of the position and speed of aircraft, is organized by flight and also contains meta-data
for each flight that include: type of operation (departure/arrival), origin and destination
airports, aircraft type (business, jet, helicopter, other, etc), date and time of beginning of
record, duration of the record, etc.
Using the available meta data, visual flight rules (VFR) traffic is discarded, since it
is more unpredictable and does not follow the same rules as instrument flight rules (IFR)
traffic. The meta data is used to sort trajectories by airport and operation type, i.e. take
off or landing. After a visual analysis of the flight patterns for the different airports, it was
decided to focus the study on the landings at SFO. It is the busiest airport in the NCT and
the arrival tracks present the most interesting patterns by their numbers and variety. The
most frequent configuration is the “West” configuration, where aircraft land on runways
28L/R and take off from runways 01L/R. A diagram of SFO is presented in Figure 10, and
Figure 11 depicts the NCT traffic patterns typically used in the west configuration.
In this work, the axes are set by the radar, located at (0, 0, 0). The x and y axes define
the horizontal plane and z the vertical direction, positive going upward. To each recorded
flight, corresponds an aircraft i and a trajectory Ti, i = 1 . . . r, where r is the total number
of trajectories of interest in the dataset. Each trajectory Ti is a ni × 4 matrix, and the
line T li of Ti is the l














i) is the 3
dimensional coordinates of aircraft i at time tli. The trajectories have different numbers of
points ni, varying from 10 to about 550 points, depending on the duration of the trajectory.
Trajectories with a few data-points usually correspond to short flights from SJC or OAK to
SFO. The interval between points is between 4 and 5 seconds and is given by the rotational
speed of the radar (most likely 4.8 sec). The time stamp tli is rounded to the nearest second.
132
A.3 Overview of k-means and DBSCAN Clustering algorithms
This section introduces the two clustering algorithms used in this appendix: k-means [87]
and DBSCAN [31].
Overview of k-means [87] This paragraph presents a brief overview of the k-means
algorithm. For more details, the reader is refereed to [54]. Given a set S = (tp1, . . . tp|S|)
of |S| observations (turning points in our case), where each observation is a d-dimensional
real vector, then k-means clustering aims at partitioning the |S| observations into k sets, or








where mi is the mean of Ci. The mean mi of a cluster is called centroid and is the center of
mass of all the elements in the cluster. The number k of clusters is the only input required
from the user.
Starting with an initial set of k centers m
(1)
1 , . . . ,m
(1)
k , which may be specified randomly or
by some heuristic, the algorithm proceeds by alternating between two steps, also known as
Lloyd Algorithm [82] :
Assignment step: Assign each observation to the cluster with the closest mean, that
is partition the observations according to the Voronoi diagram generated by the centroids







∥∥tpj −m(t)i ∥∥ ≤ ∥∥tpj −m(t)i∗ ∥∥, for all i∗ = 1, . . . , k} (72)
Update step: Calculate the new means m
(t+1)












The algorithm is deemed to have converged when the assignments no longer change.
Since it is a heuristic algorithm, there is no guarantee that it will converge to the global
optimum, and the result may depend on the initial clusters. Since the algorithm is usually
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very fast, it is common to run it multiple times with different starting conditions and keep
the run that resulted in the minimum value for Eq. (71).
Figure 51: Clusters of (turnings) points using k-means and corresponding Voronoi diagram
Overview of DBSCAN This paragraph presents a brief overview of the DBSCAN al-
gorithm. For more details, the reader is referred to [53]. DBSCAN [31] stands for Density-
Based Spatial Clustering of Applications with Noise. DBSCAN clusters points that are
close together (in an ε neighborhood), and surrounded by sufficiently many points. DB-
SCAN requires two parameters: a real number, ε, and the minimum number of points,
MinPts, required to form a cluster. The ε-neighborhood of a point p consists of all the
points q such that dist(p, q) ≤ ε. If the ε-neighborhood of a point p contains more than
MinPts, a new cluster is started, with p as a core object. DBSCAN then iteratively collects
directly density-reachable objects from these core objects. An object q is said to be directly
density-reachable from an object p if q is in the ε-neighborhood of p and p is a core object.
If a core object q of a cluster Ci is added a cluster Cj , Ci and Cj are merged. When no
point can be added to any cluster, the process terminates.
A.4 Way-point based trajectory clustering
This section presents a novel algorithm for aircraft trajectory clustering. This algorithm
takes advantage of aircraft trajectory properties: aircraft usually fly straight, with a limited
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number of turns. This method arises from the current instrument flight rules procedures.
When approaching an airport, aircraft usually follow published procedures made of a se-
quence of way-points. A way-point is characterized by its GPS coordinates and, sometimes,
an altitude indication. The planar localization of a way-point is very accurate but its verti-
cal component often looks like “at or above —ft”. Vertical clearances are delivered by ATC
and trajectories’ vertical profiles are then at the discretion of the pilots. Therefore, this
method focuses on the 2D coordinates of the way-points in the (x, y) plane. This method
is an efficient way to determine the compliance of flown trajectories with published proce-
dures. Nevertheless, published procedures cannot be used because of the limited number
of way-points or reporting points located in the TRACON. In Section 5.3, we further show
this by comparing the results of the trajectory clustering with the published way-points.
The objective is to identify and group the turning points into “way-points”. A turning
point is a point in the trajectory where the aircraft changes heading. Then trajectories are
represented by a sequence of way-points. Finally, trajectories are clustered by determining
the Longest Common Subsequence (LCS) . The algorithm proceeds using the following steps
and it is summarized in Figure 52:
1. Identify the location of the turning points of each trajectory.
2. Cluster the set of all the turning points of all the trajectories. This clustering task
is done using k-means [86, 54] or DBSCAN [31] (Density-Based Spatial Clustering of
Applications with Noise). Section A.3 gives an overview of those algorithms. This
clustering provides a finite number of way-points where it has been determined that
aircraft usually turn.
3. Represent each trajectory by its sequence of way-points.
4. Cluster the sequences of way-points using the SequenceMiner algorithm [12, 13]. Se-
quenceMiner provides us with a representative trajectory for each cluster.
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Figure 52: Way-point clustering method
A.4.1 Turning points identification
The first step is to extract the location of the turning points of each trajectory. To simplify
the notations, the aircraft index i is omitted in the following equations. The heading Ψl
of an aircraft at time tl can be estimated by ψl = arctan y
l+1−yl−1
xl+1−xl−1 , at each point of the
trajectory, l, l = 2 . . . n − 1, where n is the total number of points. Since the trajectory is
a bit noisy, a low pass filter is applied:
ψ̃1 = ψ1 (74)
ψ̃l = αψl + (1− α)ψ̃l−1, l = 2 . . . n− 1, (75)
where α is a constant for the filter. On this data, setting α = 0.4 provided good noise filtering
results and not too much delay. A turning point tp is identified when the heading difference
between two consecutive values of the heading exceed a threshold: |Ψ̃l − Ψ̃l−1| > Ψc. The
threshold was chosen relatively small in order to capture small heading changes but not small
enough not to capture meaningless heading changes variations: Ψc = 0.025rad = 1.43
◦. This
value was set experimentally. The results are not very sensitive to a small change in Ψc. The
number of turning points is trimmed to avoid long sequences when aircraft are executing
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large turns: if two consecutive data-points are determined to be turning points, then only
the first one is kept; if three, only the middle one, etc.
The trajectory of aircraft i is now represented as a sequence of turning points Si :
Si =
{





where tpsi is the 3D coordinate of the s
th turning point of trajectory i. The first point of
the trajectory is labeled as a turning point. Figure 53 presents a sample of 11 trajectories
and the points identified as turning points.


























Figure 53: Trajectories and identified turning points for sample trajectories
Denote by S the set of all the turning points for all the trajectories: S = {S1 . . . Sn} .
The second step is to cluster the set S of turning points.
A.4.2 Turning points clustering; creation of way-points
To determine the way-points, the turning points are clustered: a way-point is defined as the
planar (x, y) coordinates of a cluster of turning points. The idea is to create a way-point
where it has been determined that many aircraft turned. Depending on the number and
on the density of available turning points, two different algorithms are used. When the
spatial distribution of turning points is sparse, k-means is used, and when the distribution
of turning points is dense, DBSCAN is used.
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A.4.2.1 Case when the data is sparse
When the number of turning points is small, a density based clustering algorithm would
provide poor results, identifying most of the points as outliers. Therefore, a distance-
based algorithm is used so all the turning points available are used. A way-point is cre-
ated for each cluster produced by k-means. Using cylindrical coordinates, the coordinates
of the center of a way-point are given by (rm, θm). The center is the center of mass
of all the points in the cluster. The coordinates of the corners of the way-points are
given by {(rm + 2stdr, θm + 2stdθ), (rm − 2stdr, θm + 2stdθ), (rm − 2stdr, θm − 2stdθ),
(rm + 2stdr, θm − 2stdθ)}, where stdr and stdθ are the standard deviation of the radial coor-
dinates and angular coordinates of the points in the cluster, respectively. Figure 54 presents
the outcome of clustering the way-points for one day of trajectories. Each cluster is repre-
sented using a different color/shape combination. The way-points are represented by pairs
of nested polygons on the figure. The inside polygon corresponds to (rm ± stdr, θm ± stdθ)
and the outside one to (rm ± 2stdr, θm ± 2stdθ). The number is the label of the cluster.
Figure 54: Result of the clustering of the turning points for one day using k-means
A.4.2.2 Case when the data is dense
When the the number of turning points is large, a large share of the airspace is covered
with turning points. A distance based algorithm such as k-means provides meaningless
clusters for our application. Figure 51 shows the clusters provided by k-means and the
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corresponding Voronoi diagram for the turnings point of almost 3 months of data (30,000
trajectories).
To overcome this issue, the turning points were clustered using DBSCAN. DBSCAN
is particularly efficient at cluster data in the presence of noise. Way-points are created
using the convex hull of the clusters resulting from DBSCAN. Figure 55 shows the result
of the clustering of the turning points using DBSCAN. The blue polygons represent the
way-points. All the points identified as outliers, i.e not associated with any way-point, are
not depicted. The parameters used were ε = 350m and minPts = 10. The main issue with
DBSCAN is its execution time since its complexity is in O(n log n). Here, the number of
turning points to cluster is n = 118, 179 for 30,000 trajectories.
Figure 55: Result of the clustering of the turning points for the entire dataset using
DBSCAN. Outliers are not displayed
A.4.3 Converting a trajectory into a sequence of way-points
The way-points have been discovered using the turning points of the trajectories. Never-
theless, some trajectories might go over way-points without actually turning. To identify
the sequence of way-points followed by a trajectory, the following procedure is used for
each trajectory: start with an empty sequence of way-points, and given the set of all way-
points, run the trajectory along its original direction. If one of the points is located over
a way-point, the way-point is added to the sequence. Each trajectory is now represented
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as an ordered sequence of way-points, where the number of way-points is finite. The next
step is to cluster the trajectories determining the longest common subsequence (LCS) of
way-points.
A.4.4 Longest common subsequence determination
The sequences of way-points are clustered using the longest common subsequence. The LCS
problem is to find the longest subsequence common to all sequences in a set of sequences.
SequenceMiner [12, 13] is an algorithm that identifies the LCS and generates clusters of
sequences. With this method it is possible to cluster sequences that do not contain the same
number of elements. When sequences only have a small number of points, say fewer than 3,
this clustering method does not work well. Therefore, only the sequences containing more
than 4 way-points are kept. The total number of way-points being small, it is preferable to
focus on the way-points at the beginning of the trajectory: since most aircraft do a final turn
to get aligned with the runway, this turning point does not bring much information about
the trajectory. Therefore, if the last turning point is in the large brown cluster (Figure 55),
it is removed from the sequence.
Figure 56 presents the results of the clustering process using k-means and LCS on a
low number of trajectories. The dataset used is the tracks of all the aircraft landing at San
Francisco (SFO) airport on February 10, 2006. Only the trajectories of that day were used to
determine the way-points. Each cluster is represented by a color. The algorithm identifies
the main flows but a few trajectories seem not to belong to the expected cluster. The
quality of the results is subjective and can only be visually assessed. Figure 57 presents
the results for an initial set of 30,000 trajectories, using DBSCAN and LCS. Here, the
denomination “Nominal” qualifies the trajectories containing more than 4 way-points. The
colors correspond to the clusters. The colors differ on Figures 56 and 57 because the indexing
of clusters is random and depends on the order of the data in the dataset.
Overall, this method presents good clustering results. One of the main drawbacks of
this method is that it only keeps the trajectories going over the way-points. For instance,
consider two parallel trajectories: one going over the way-points and the other one slightly
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Figure 56: Results of trajectory clustering for the landings of one day at SFO
Figure 57: Results of trajectory clustering for 30,000 trajectories
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Figure 58: Trajectory clustering method based on Principal Components Analysis
off. The latter will be considered as an outlier even though it is very similar to the first
trajectory. In addition, trajectories containing large rerouting periods will belong to the
clusters as long as they pass over way-points.
A.5 Trajectory-based clustering via principal components analysis
This method proceeds with the following steps, which are summarized in a diagram in figure
58:
1. Re-sample the trajectories, to obtain time series of equal length for each aircraft.
2. Augment the dimensionality of the data. Normalize and concatenate all the data into
a single vector for each flight.
3. Run a principal components analysis (PCA) and keep the first 5 principal components
(PCs).
4. Cluster using a density-based clustering algorithm.
This appendix proposes improvements to the approach used by Eckstein [26] to realize
a trajectory taxonomy. In [26], trajectories are first re-sampled, then the principal compo-
nents are extracted and finally, the clustering is realized using k-means on the projections
onto the first two principal components. Figure 59(a) presents the resulting clusters on the
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3D plot of the first 3 PCs of the trajectories after clustering
First PC
Second PC
(b) Clusters of the first principal components
Figure 59: Clustering results using the method presented in [26]
principal components and on the trajectories, using the methods introduced in [26]. The
clustering technique proposed in [26] does not provide results precise enough for our data set
and there is no identification of outliers. Figure 59(b) presents a 3D view of the projection
onto the first three PCs (section A.5.3) so it can be compared with our method. Eckstein
used only the first two PCs for clustering. The first improvement is to augment the dimen-
sionality of the data. Then, the PCs are computed and the projections of the augmented
trajectories onto the first five PCs are clustered using a density based clustering algorithm.
This algorithm presents the advantage of identifying outliers. Another advantage is that
the number of clusters is not set a priori.
A.5.1 Trajectory resampling
The dataset is well organized and clean. Trajectories with fewer than 50 points are removed
from the dataset: to be able to use a clustering algorithm such as DBSCAN, each trajectory
must be represented as a vector. All vectors must have the same number of elements n,
so their distance can be computed. Since all trajectories do not have the same number of
points, re-sampling is necessary. Trajectories are resampled so that the total number of
points for each trajectory is 50. For the sole purpose of clustering, fewer than 50 points
would have been enough. Nevertheless, to improve the accuracy of the airspace monitoring
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function presented in section 5.3, 50 points were used. The re-sampled trajectory T ′i is
given by T sampi =
{
T li , l =
{
round(k ni50 ), k = 1 . . . 50
}}
. During this operation, the notion
of speed that was given by the distance between the radar echoes is lost. For example,
consider the trajectories of two aircraft with the exact same flight path, but one going twice
as fast as the other. After re-sampling, the trajectories will have the exact same points and
it will be impossible to determine that there was a speed difference.
A.5.2 Dimensionality augmentation
To improve the results of the clustering, the dimensionality of the data was increased. Some
of the added dimensions present symmetry with respect to a point or a line and some do
not.
 Cartesian position of the aircraft in the re-sampled trajectory:








i . . . z
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i ]. P is a row vector with 150 components. This vector
is unique to each trajectory.








2, l = 1 . . . 50
}
. Provides information about the rate
of convergence of the aircraft toward the center of the TRACON, which is located
close to the airport. This distance presents a symmetry with respect to the center of
the TRACON, i.e two trajectories that are symmetric with respect to the center of
the TRACON will be represented with the same vector R.





(xli − xref )2 + (yli − yref )2 + (zli)2, l = 1 . . . 50
}
, where (xref , yref ) are
the coordinates of the top left corner of a square containing the TRACON. The
top left corner has coordinates (xref , yref ) = (−80, 80)km. This distance presents a
symmetry with respect of the diagonal joining the top left corner (−80, 80) and the
bottom right corner (80,−80), i.e two trajectories that are symmetric with respect to
this diagonal will be represented with the same vector D.









only one dimension, the angular position provides information about the overall lo-
cation of the trajectory in the TRACON, i.e in which quadrant of the circle the
trajectory lies. This information does not present any symmetry.
 Heading of the aircraft Ψ =
{
ψli, l = 1 . . . 50
}
. The computation of the heading was
done using the filter of equation 74 and then re-sampled to 50 points. A constant
value or a slow rate of change indicate a straight trajectory, while a high variability
indicates a curved trajectory. This vector is unique to each trajectory.
The sine and cosine values of the angular position and heading are used instead of their
actual value to avoid the discontinuity at 2π. Each augmented trajectory is now represented
by a vector of dimension 450 given by:
T augmi = [P R D cos(Θ) sin(Θ) cos(Ψ) sin(Ψ)]. The initial vector had dimension
150. The values of each parameter are normalized between 0 and 1 in order to balance their
importance during the clustering process. It was decided to add meaningful data such
as heading or rate of convergence toward the center of the TRACON. For instance, two
aircraft on parallel trajectories will fly the same heading, even if the trajectories are slightly
apart from each other. Distance to the center was chosen to identify trajectories that have
particular patterns such as vectoring and holding pattern: the distance to the center will
present some irregularities as the aircraft flies back and forth. Such irregularities will be
highlighted by dimensions such as the heading that will change 180◦ while the position will
only change slightly.
A.5.3 Principal components analysis
A principal components analysis [129] is run on matrix that contains all the re-sampled
trajectories. Each trajectory is then projected onto the first p principal components and
is now represented by a vector of p values. The choice in the value of p is a trade-off
between computational speed when p is small and accuracy when p gets larger. There is no
need to get a value of p too large since the first principal components contain most of the
information. Different values of p were tried and p = 5 gave a satisfactory level of accuracy
for this type of data. The added dimensions increase the range of the projection of the
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trajectories onto the principal components. This makes the clustering task easier as the
clusters are “further apart” in the principal components space.
A.5.4 Clustering
The projections of the trajectories onto the first 5 PCs are clustered using DBSCAN. A
density based clustering algorithm like DBSCAN is preferred to a distance based algorithm
because of the shape of the clusters can be arbitrary. The other advantage of DBSCAN is
the identification of outliers. Figure 60(b) presents the resulting clusters. The axes corre-
spond to the values of the first 3 principal components. Clusters are clearly differentiated,
even if they are not easy to distinguish on the plot due to the perspective effect. The
resulting clusters of trajectories are visually very clean (Figure 60(a)). Figure 61 presents


















3D plot of the first 3 PCs of the trajectories after clustering
First PC
Second PC
(b) Clusters of the first 5 principal components
Figure 60: Clustering results using re-sampling, data augmentation, PCA decomposition,
and DBSCAN on the first 5 principal components.
the centroids, that is the center of mass of the trajectories of each cluster. Those centroids
can be seen as “typical operations”. Some clusters are minor variations from each other,
such as the flights coming from the bottom left corner. This comes from the settings used
for DBSCAN. On Figure 60(b), one can clearly identify clusters of points. The algorithm
was run with a high sensitivity (ε small and minPts large). The parameter ε reflects the
similarity between trajectories (the smaller the more similar), and minPts is the number of
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“similar” trajectories needed to create a new cluster (Section A.4.2.2). A small ε generates
“narrow” cluster while a larger ε will generate clusters with more variability in trajectories.
In the application presented in section 5.3, the algorithm is run with a lower sensitivity and
provides fewer clusters, with larger variability. The resulting centroids of this run can be
seen on Figure 49.




















Figure 61: Clusters centroids (average trajectory)
A.5.5 Analysis of outliers
Figure 62 shows the outliers detected by the clustering algorithm. Outliers represent 19.5%
of all trajectories. A visual inspection shows that the main reasons for being detected as
an outlier is the presence of holding patterns, large vectoring maneuvers or direct routes.
Figure 63 presents the number and frequency of outlier trajectories as a function of the
type of aircraft. Commercial jets represent the largest share in numbers, but the frequency
is much smaller. Among the trajectories of regional and business aircraft, 4% and 5% are
identified as outliers, respectively. A possible explanation is the size, the speed and the
maneuverability of the aircraft. To ensure a safe separation at the runway threshold, air
traffic controllers “vector” aircraft, that is give a sequence of headings to follow. The vectors
given to business and regional aircraft might be different and sharper than the vectors given
to larger size jets.
Figure 64 presents the frequency of outliers for each day of study. Each bar represents
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Figure 63: Distribution of outliers by aircraft category
one day. The minimum percentage of outliers is less than 2% and goes up to 16%. The most
likely explanation for the outliers is the weather. San Francisco airport usually operates
with two close parallel runways. The runways are not independent, that is, they cannot
be operated simultaneously when the weather does not permit visual approaches. When a
runway is closed, the landing capacity is reduced from 60 to 30 aircraft per hour. Schedules
and operations usually take the weather into account , but unexpected late fog dissipation
or other type of convective weather might disrupt the operations and force controllers to
vector aircraft and put them on holding patterns.
Figure 65 presents the frequency of outliers as a function of the time of the day. The
local time is reported on the abscissa axis, starting at midnight. This diagram is an average
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Figure 64: Histogram of outliers, day by day




















Figure 65: Histogram of outliers, hour by hour, local time
over the entire period of interest. The frequency of outliers is higher during the period 12
a.m. - 4 a.m., then decreases in the early morning, to an increase again with a peak at 11
a.m.. Another peak is visible at 5 p.m.. The outliers identified at night are mostly due to
direct routing that is allowed by the very low traffic density at night. During the morning,
traffic density increases and requires more rerouting for efficient sequencing and merging.
Another possible explanation is the late dissipation of the fog.
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APPENDIX B
SELECTED SESAR AND NEXTGEN RESEARCH ISSUES
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Table 6: NextGen safety oriented research topics [70]
Ref Line Reference Issue
R-6 In addition, backup functions are
distributed throughout the sys-
tem, and there are layers of
protection to allow for graceful
degradation of services in the
event of automation failures.
Develop guidance for what flexibility is
allowed in the implementation of airborne
separation management algorithms to ensure
operationally consistent results, understanding
whether variations in algorithms can result
in major impacts on overall operations.
R-9
C-ATM is the means by which
flight operator objectives are bal-
anced with overall NAS per-
formance objectives and accom-
plishes many of the objectives for
CM, FCM, and TM.
Super Density operations will result in many air-
craft in close proximity. Consequently an air-
craft deviating from its assigned trajectory
is much more likely to cause an immediate
conflict with another aircraft, and safe avoid-
ance maneuvers may be limited or unavail-
able. How can super density operations be
conducted safely, especially in the presence
of severe weather?
R-10 C-ATM is the means by which
flight operator objectives are bal-
anced with overall NAS per-
formance objectives and accom-
plishes many of the objectives for
CM, FCM, and TM.
Develop requirements for a collision avoid-
ance system that is compatible with
NextGen tactical separation? Unless man-
dated otherwise, some aircraft will likely be
equipped with legacy TCAS/ACAS systems which
may generate unwanted alerts during normal oper-
ations. How should this be accounted for?
R-28 In all, these new kinds of flight
operations dramatically im-
prove en route productivity
and capacity and are essential
to achieving NextGen.
If the automation fails, what is
the backup plan in terms of peo-
ple/procedures/automation?
R-44 As illustrated in Figure 24,
super-density corridors handle
arriving and departing traffic,
while much nearby airspace re-
mains available to other traffic.
We do not prove today’s ATC system is safe,
but rely on historical data. NextGen will be
required to both be safe and to demonstrate
it is safe. How will safety be designed into
all aspects of NextGen and then proven?
P-1 In addition, backup functions are
distributed throughout the sys-
tem, and there are layers of
protection to allow for graceful
degradation of services in the
event of automation failures.
Develop policies concerning liability for del-
egated separation and self-separation opera-
tions.
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Table 7: SESAR safety oriented research topics [125]
No Research topic
15 Study of the following automation topics: Automated separation tools and safety,
impact of automation on capacity and impact of loss of situation awareness and
tools to manage exceptions associated with loss of situation awareness.
16 Evaluation of ground based deconfliction automation support tools with particular
focus on how to ensure feasible solutions with a minimum of constraints on the
users trajectory.
41 Evaluation of terminal route structure design involving alternative arrival tech-
niques with multiple or single merging points.
42 Evaluation of Time Based Separation (TBS) on merging points focusing on accu-
racy requirements and benefits.
49 Study on dynamic risk modeling and management techniques for on-line measure-
ment of safety risk. Study on the assessment of the overall safety of the CONOPS.
For now, it is not obvious that the concepts ideas all together are safe in principal
(as statemorningbulletin2010d e.g. in Episode 3 objectives).
51 Model complex scenarios of new trajectory based arrival/departure techniques plus
existing SID/STAR and also with the SID/STAR from nearby airports plus transit
traffic
54 Study controller acceptability of ASAS Spacing versus ASAS Separation during
the organization of streams of traffic
62 Development, evaluation and agreement on separation minima for each separation
method included in the concept
64 The new separation modes described at least Dynamic Route Allocation, 4D
Contracts and ASAS-Self Separation in mixed mode environment shall be assessed
with regard to maturity and potential performance: New separation modes shall
be assessed with regard to maturity and potential performance: The robustness
and stability of the various methods in the face of unexpected events (even of small
magnitude) is to be investigated.
80 Elaboration of high density separation concepts and associated airspace issues
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